DC – US v Class – Latest filings

Document 136 reads:

The parties also request that the court set a new trial date of October 27, 2014, and convert the current September 9 proceeding to a status conference.. The purpose of the continuance is to allow the parties to engage in negotiations to possibly resolve the case. Mr. Class agrees that the time until October 27, 2014, is excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(G) & 3161(h)(7)(A).

Date Filed # Docket Text
08/27/2014 Rodney Class has filed a motion 108 for permission to subpoena witnesses. However, Class has shown nothing preventing him from adhering to the procedures that a defendant must follow under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 and Local Criminal Rule 17.1 in order to have witnesses appear for testimony. Absent a showing that he has been precluded from following the procedures set forth in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Local Criminal Rules, there appears to be no need for any order granting Class permission to do what our rules allow him to do already, and his motion is moot. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Class motion 108 to subpoena witnesses be, and hereby is, DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Richard W. Roberts on 8/27/2014. (lcrwr3) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
08/28/2014 135 LEAVE TO FILE DENIED – Objection to Judge Richard W. Roberts “Leave to File Denied” Order of 6/20/14, Docket No. 120 by RODNEY CLASS. This document is unavailable as the Court denied its filing. “Leave to file DENIED” Signed by Chief Judge Richard W. Roberts on 8/26/14. (mlp) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
08/29/2014 136 Unopposed MOTION to Continue Trial by RODNEY CLASS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kramer, A.J.) (Entered: 08/29/2014)

Walt transfered to Bledsoe County prison

Walt has ‘arrived’… He is now in the County facility where he will be serving his 3 year sentence after having been convicted by a jury of his peers for aggravated perjury and extortion. Walt and some of his friends continue to believe that there is some conspiracy and corruption taking place because they fail to understand that under the laws and statutes of TN, the judge gets to appoint the foreperson of the grand jury as the 13th “juror” for a 2 year period of time and that he may re-appoint said foreperson for multiple, consecutive periods. In addition, Walt and some of his supporters, fail to appreciate that the statute which prohibits jurors for serving more than once in a 12 month period of time does not apply to the foreperson since he or she is appointed to summoned.

Walt’s history is full of example in which he refuses to admit to his mistakes. A good example is his court martial.

Walt is rumored to not want to receive any mail or phone calls. This may be a good time for Walt to reflect on who his friends are and what the future holds for him.

It’s never too late to admit to one’s follies and return to a productive life. And to answer the P&E, no McMinn county has not silenced him, that has been his own choice.

Arpaio’s MCSO and Chinese spies

A chinese national gets access to sensitive documents and Arpaio’s second in command covered it up?

In fact, a review of records shows that David Hendershott, who was second-in-command at the sheriff’s office, moved aggressively to maintain silence, a silence that has now lasted some seven years. Two weeks after Fan departed, Hendershott directed others in writing not to discuss Fan and the possible breach. In an email to the outside contractor that had hired Fan, Hendershott wrote: “Keep this between us and only us.”



TX – Taitz v Johnson – Orly Strikes Out

In spite of a Judge who seems to be on a war path with the government about immigration, Orly failed to get what she wanted

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Andrew S. Hanen. MOTION HEARING held on 8/27/2014. Appearances: O.Taitz, Atty/Plaintiff; D.Hu, AUSA; C.Kisor, AUSA;(Court Reporter: B.Barnard)(01:31-03:44/ 03:55-05:49). All parties present and ready to proceed. Discussion held as to pending motions. Oral argument held. Govts witness K. Oaks sworn in/ testified/ cross. Govts Exhibits #2,#3,#4 admitted. Defts Exhibit #1 admitted. Court Break. Court Resumes. All parties present. Govts Witness T.Brooks sworn in/ testified/ cross. Govts Witness A.Fierro sworn in/ testified/ cross. Govt concludes its presentation. O.Taitz addressed the Court. Court addressed the parties. Court DENIES the termporary restraining order. Plaintiff has until 09/12/14 to file amended complaint. Defendants have until 10/03/14 to respond either by answer or by motion to dismiss. Plaintiff may reply by 11/17/14. Injunction hearing will be held on 10/29/14 at 10:00 am. Initial Conference set for 10/28/14 is cancelled. Depositions to be taken after amended complaint and with Courts permission. Court adjourned.

From what I have heard, Orly may have perjured herself when she submitted an affidavit stating that all parties agreed to waive the 100 mile rule when in fact she had not contacted at least one of her ‘witnesses’.

Sloppy… As expected.


FL – Common Law Knitting Club versus the law

It seems that the Florida Common Law “grand jury” knitting club may soon be starting its shenanigans.

I wonder if they are familiar with Florida Code 843.0855 ? It’s about time that the Sovereigns are protecting themselves from these ‘knitting clubs’… Note that the original statute had been found to be unconstitutionally as it was overly broad. Larry Klayman obviously is familiar with the statute while serving as a “Citizens Grand Jury” prosecutor.

843.0855 Criminal actions under color of law or through use of simulated legal process.–

(1) As used in this section:

(a) The term “legal process” means a document or order issued by a court or filed or recorded for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction or representing a claim against a person or property, or for the purpose of directing a person to appear before a court or tribunal, or to perform or refrain from performing a specified act. “Legal process” includes, but is not limited to, a summons, lien, complaint, warrant, injunction, writ, notice, pleading, subpoena, or order.
(b) The term “person” means an individual, public or private group incorporated or otherwise, legitimate or illegitimate legal tribunal or entity, informal organization, official or unofficial agency or body, or any assemblage of individuals.
(c) The term “public officer” means a public officer as defined by s. 112.061.
(d) The term “public employee” means a public employee as defined by s. 112.061.

(2) Any person who deliberately impersonates or falsely acts as a public officer or tribunal, public employee or utility employee, including, but not limited to, marshals, judges, prosecutors, sheriffs, deputies, court personnel, or any law enforcement authority in connection with or relating to any legal process affecting persons and property, or otherwise takes any action under color of law against persons or property, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(3) Any person who simulates legal process, including, but not limited to, actions affecting title to real estate or personal property, indictments, subpoenas, warrants, injunctions, liens, orders, judgments, or any legal documents or proceedings, knowing or having reason to know the contents of any such documents or proceedings or the basis for any action to be fraudulent, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(4) Any person who falsely under color of law attempts in any way to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public officer or law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official duties by means of, but not limited to, threats of or actual physical abuse or harassment, or through the use of simulated legal process, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.


(a) Nothing in this section shall make unlawful any act of any law enforcement officer or legal tribunal which is performed under lawful authority.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit individuals from assembling freely to express opinions or designate group affiliation or association.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit or in any way limit a person’s lawful and legitimate access to the courts or prevent a person from instituting or responding to legitimate and lawful legal process.

Walt – Bias of the Grand Jury

van Irion presented an ‘argument’ that the Grand Jury which indicted Walt was somehow tainted. There is one problem with this argument

Read Rippy v. State, 550 SW 2d 636 – Tenn: Supreme Court 1977

Petitioners complain that the Grand Jury was not impartial and unbiased and its proceedings were not held secret.

The only statutory disqualification of grand jurors by reason of interest is set forth in § 40-1613, T.C.A.:

If any member of the grand jury is charged with an indictable offense, or is a prosecutor, or if the offense was committed against his person or property, or if he is connected by blood or marriage with the person charged, he shall not be present at or take part in the consideration of the charge, or the deliberations of his fellow jurors thereon.

[NBC: The jurors were neither victims of the crimes against Cunningham, nor where they connected by blood or marriage, so any objections that they had heard about Walt will likely be rejected as irrelevant]

Almost one hundred years ago this Court, in State v. Chairs and McNeal, 68 Tenn. 196, 197 (1877) declared:

[W]e do not understand that our laws require that the grand jurors shall be free from any previous opinion as to the guilt of the accused.

[NBC: This is a major hurdle for Walt to overcome as there is no requirement that the grand jurors shall be free from any previous opinion.]

This same language was quoted with approval in State v. Felts, 220 Tenn. 484, 489, 418 S.W.2d 772, 774 (1967). This seems to accord with the prevailing view throughout the United States. Thus, in 38 Am.Jur.2d, 642*642 Grand Jury, § 7, under the heading, “Effect of bias, prejudice, or interest” we find:

Generally, in the absence of a controlling statutory provision, a person is not disqualified or incompetent to serve as a grand juror by reason ofbias or prejudice on his part, by the fact that he has heard or read about the case under investigation or has even formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, or by his interest in a prosecution other than a direct pecuniary interest. The reasons assigned in support of this rule are that a grand jury, being an accusatory and not a judicial body, has the right and obligation to act on its own information, however acquired; that the oath required to be taken by grand jurors contemplates that they may be called on to act in the cases of both enemies and friends and requires them to inquire diligently into the commission of crimes; and that those who live in the vicinity of the place where the crime was committed know better than others the character of the parties and of the witnesses and are, therefore, particularly proper members of the grand jury. However, there seems no authority which goes so far as to hold that this would be true where the jurors had determined through malice or bribery to violate their oaths. (Footnotes omitted)

We, therefore, hold that in the absence of a statutory prohibition, express malice, bribery or other equally reprehensible conduct, there is no legal objection to a person with bias or prejudice serving as a member of a grand jury.