AK – Lamb v Obama – Smack…

No. 1485 S-15155 Lamb v. Obama [other civil]
http://www.courtrecords.alaska.gov/webd … m-1485.pdf

Mr. Lamb clearly lacks interest-injury standing to sue because he cannot establish any injury in fact, nor can he show a genuine controversy. Mr. Lamb claims that his failure to vote was his injury. However, the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government — claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large” — does not present a controversy.Mr. Lamb’scomplaint alleges nothing more than non-justiciable abstract and theoretical claim

Ouch

The court is under no obligation to accept as true Mr. Lamb’s complaint that is full of legal conclusions and bald assertions cloaked as facts. Bare legal conclusions are not entitled to the benefit of the presumption of truth and are not accorded every favorable inference.

Moreover, Mr. Lamb has failed to plead any facts that fit within any cognizable legal theory. Mr. Lamb’s complaint gives his version of the history of Mr. Obama’s life and presidency; however he neither states nor provides allegations sufficient for any recognized cause of action. Even if the complaint and summons were properly served, Mr. Lamb had standing, and this court had jurisdiction, Mr. Lamb pleads no claim entitled to relief.

That should be the end of it…

Brian Reilly answers questions

Brian Reilly has answered some of the questions asked by readers of Dr Conspiracy’s blog.

Some interesting answers

Notorial Dissent:
“The only question I would have at this time would be, did Zullo and the MCCCP ever really do any serious investigation, or was it merely a matter of copying what someone else had done, or simply taking what they said as gospel?”

In my opinion it was not an investigation.  Thank you for your kind remarks.

Even Miki Booth gets to ask a question. Not a very good one but still.

Miki Booth:

“Who gets custody of the forgery?”

Is there a forgery? How would you know?

MD – Taitz v Colvin – Rejected – Orly needs to file a motion for leave

[Update: The Judge corrected the record and ordered the document to be filed. It’s time for a ruling which by all likelihood will be a dismissal. There is just nothing there.]

Orly has filed a document which, under the rules of the Court, cannot be filed without leave of court. Judge Hollander is tightening down on the rules. I can already predict her next move.

State of Tennessee v. Todd Joseph Sweet a/k/a Jamie Lee Turpin – Denial of Counsel

Todd Sweet, who I introduced in this posting, is upset that the Court denied him access to counsel but he had laid the foundation for the courts refusal, when he admitted to owning multi-millions in an account in Malaysia.

During the Defendant’s November 17, 2008, arraignment, the trial court inquired about the Defendant’s ability to hire an attorney. The trial court first swore in the Defendant, who then testified that the TBI had seized the land that he owned. Upon further questioning by the trial court, the Defendant testified that, while he did not have any money in the United States, he had “[m]ulti-millions” in an account in Malaysia. The trial court informed the Defendant that, based on these assets, he would be required to hire his own attorney, to which the Defendant responded, “Okay.” The trial court set an “attorney date” for January 26, 2009, informing the Defendant that he would need to be present in court with his attorney on that date.

He even elaborated further

The Defendant then filled out the affidavit, was sworn by the trial court, and maintained that he had over ten million dollars in off-shore bank accounts. The Defendant further claimed that he owned vehicles valued at $750,000, trucks valued at $200,000, snowmobiles valued at $20,000, and two motorcycles. The Defendant said that he could not access his money “from here.” The trial court expressed doubt about the accuracy of the Defendant’s testimony and appointed him an attorney. The trial court stated that the State needed to proceed on at least one of the indictments by April 13, and the State informed the trial court that it would proceed on indictment 08-081. The trial court set a trial date for case 08-081 for February 24, 2009.

Things get better

On January 26, 2009, the State informed the trial court that the Defendant had come to Monroe County from another state in November and that, according to the Interstate Compact, the State only had six months to try at least one of his cases. The trial court noted that the Defendant did not have an attorney present, and the Defendant said he had not hired one. The Defendant requested the trial judge “contact the U.S. Department of Homeland Security” because there were “explosives sitting in Sweetwater right now.” The trial court informed the Defendant that, as a judge, he could not comply with this request to contact the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and he asked the Defendant to fill out an affidavit of indigency. The Defendant said he would not do so because he was “not going to perjure [him]self.” The trial court implored him to simply tell the truth.

When he claimed that he was unable to access the money, the court appointed a lawyer for him. If Todd wanted to hire a different lawyer, using his own money, he could and should have done so. The court, in spite of the admissions by Todd that he owned multi million dollars and other assets, assigned counsel to him.

State of Tennessee v. Todd Joseph Sweet a/k/a Jamie Lee Turpin – Introduction

[Updated to reflect that Sweet was convicted in two cases before Judge Ross]

State v Sweet is an interesting case in Monroe County Tennessee, involving a person who has been accusing his Judge of misconduct and who has expressed some, flawed, claims about the TN Court system and the Grand Jury, not dissimilar from Fitzpatrick’s confusions.

In order to show a balanced overview of the case, allowing the reader to make up her own mind, I will provide some of the court records that help understand the circumstances that led to his convictions.

The original cases were heard by Judge Caroll Ross in the Monroe County Circuit Court as State of Tennessee versus Todd Joseph Sweet, case E2010-00728-SC-R11-CD and case E2010-00729-SC-R11-CD

Darren Huff – Gone Sovereign?

Poor Darren, again he falls victim to poor advice and understanding of issues of law. He was written up for “insolence towards a staff member” of the Texarkana prison. He claims freedom of speech as an unalienable right, even for prisoners…^[1]

Come now the Undersigned Darren Wesley Huff, the REAL PARTY OF INTEREST (Fed R Civ Proc Rule 17), a non corporate, natural born, living, breathing and sentient, on the land, with clean hands, [r]ectus in curia, and demands DISMISSAL of these charges for this court’s lack of jurisdiction of this Personum… Darren Welsey Huff, who is an Authorized Representative of DARREN WESLEY HUFF, the corporate entity in this case. The Undersigned asserts that Texarkana FCI is a corporate entity and can only adjudicate another corporate entity, not the flesh and blood, living, breathing, sentient being Darren Wesley Huff.

Source: Post and Email

RC Radio – 3/11/14 Startling new revelations about dysfunctional CCP

Tonight we will cover Brian Reilly’s “tell all” article about the Cold Case Posse and its leader Mike Zullo published at Obama Conspiracy Theories blog this week. DId Zullo fire Corsi? Is it true that some Posse members are provided luxury cars and free gasoline at the expense of Maricopa County taxpayers?

Download here

Debunking the Myths – Sovereign Citizens – Oath of Office

Contrary to the claims by Sovereign Citizens, a judge who has not taken his oath of office still is a de facto judge, at least at the Federal level.

See for example: Ramos v. Pyramid Tribal Court, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 626 F. Supp. 1582 – Dist. Court, D. Nevada 1986. See also McDowell v. United States, 159 US 596 – Supreme Court 1895

Judge de facto is defined as:

One who holds and exercises the office of a judge under color of lawful authority and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the office, as where he was appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by an usurper of the appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office.

Black’s Law Dictionary 5th Ed. 755. A judge who in complete good faith continues to hold court beyond the term for which he was assigned may be considered a de facto1583*1583 judge. Oklahoma Transp. Co. v. Lewis, 177 Okl. 106, 58 P.2d 128, 129 (1936).

The proper action to challenge the Judge would be through a Quo Warranto action, which in case of the federal government, needs to be filed in DC and can be filed only by someone who has a direct interest in the office and who has been granted leave by court or by the Attorney General at his own discretion. What is particularly hilarious is that most common law jurisdictions have adopted a de facto officer doctrine.

Also

A officer becomes a de facto officer under four circumstances: (1) by exercising his or her duties without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his or her action, supposing him or her to be the officer he or she assumed to be; (2) where the official exercises his or her duties under color of known and valid appointment or election, but fails to conform to some precedent, requirement, or condition, such as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like; (3) under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public; or (4) under color of any election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged as such.

Source: SIERRA CLUB v. CASTLE COOKE HOMES HAWAI INC 25, Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

Good luck arguing in Hawaii…

Debunking the Myths – Sovereign Citizens – The right to practice law

Recently, in one of Anthony William’s court ‘appearances’, he cited several cases that he believes allows him to practice law (or perfect law as he calls it) without being properly admitted. However the cases do not really support his position, when looked at in more detail.

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of NM, 353 US 232 – Supreme Court 1957

A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection239*239 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.^[5]Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114. Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. And see Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13. A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502. Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

In other words, a State can exclude a person from practicing law as long as the qualification has a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law. The requirement that a lawyer passes the Bar exam is a rational connection with the fitness or capacity to practice law.

And yet those arguing that the Court cannot exclude such people “argue”

Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 238, 239. ..”The practice of law (medicine etc.) is not within the States grace to regulate.” The practice of law (medicine etc.) is an occupation of common right as per Sims v. Ahrens, 271 S.W. 720 (1925). No State in the Union of the United States of America licenses lawyers, only the State Bar, which issues a private corporation type of “Union Card”/certificate for payment of dues/fees. (See also ExParte v. Garland, 4 Wall 333, 370 (1866), which authorizes only the practice of law in the courts as an officer of the court and a member of the judicial branch of government, to represent wards of the court such as infants and persons of unsound mind and as a public defender in criminal cases.) …Cannot license an occupation of common right …Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813, 817-819

Redfield v Fisher is more properly cited as Redfield v. Fisher 292 P. 813, 135 Or. 180, 1930. As the observant person may notice, this is case from the Supreme Court of Oregon.

If an ad valorem tax is levied on property, then, in the absence of statutory, charter, or constitutional restrictions, the only limits to the exercise of the power to tax are the necessities of the public treasury; but where a municipality is authorized to license occupations and businesses, either for the purpose of regulation or for revenue, the power cannot be used unreasonably, nor can the tax be fixed so high that it will practically prohibit the pursuit of ordinarily lawful businesses.”

and

“The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but, the individual’s rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed.”

Source: Westlaw Citation Notes

Note that no attempt has been made that the right to live and own property and the privilege to practice law are in any form or manner equivalent. The fact remains that the Court or State can require that doctors or lawyers are properly licensed to practice in the state or court.

 

Debunking the Myths – Sovereign Citizens – Definition of Citizen

When defining the term citizen, the Sovereign Citizen often refers to 26 USC 3121 while totally avoiding the relevant statute 8 USC 1401. This mistake was most famously made in Rowe v IRS, Dist. Court, D. Maine 2006

Note that 26 USC 3121 states clearly that the definitions are ‘for the purpose of this chapter’

(e) State, United States, and citizen

For purposes of this chapter—

(1) State

The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

(2) United States

The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

8 USC 1401 explains

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:

(a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;

They may also have not heard of the 14th Amendment

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”^[3]

Ouch, another myth bites the dust. Citizens of the US and of the State in which they reside…

See also

In re Weatherley, 169 BR 555 – Bankr. Court, ED Pennsylvania 1994

Brian Reilly spilling the beans on Zullo

Brian Reilly, who set in motion the “investigation” by the Cold Case Posse has ‘spilled the beans’ on the case. See Dr Conspiracy’s web site.

First of all he places doubt on Zullo’s affidavit, filed with some courts

Mike Zullo was never in attendance at our August 18, 2011 meeting with Sheriff Arpaio or the one-on-one meeting that I had alone with Sheriff Arpaio on August 22, 2011 when I presented a formal letter from the Surprise Tea Party, written by Dr. Corsi and edited by myself, requesting the investigation. Contrary to what Zullo has stated, he did not have any direct personal knowledge of the August 18, 2011 meeting events that he discussed in point #1 of his most recent Alabama Supreme Court affidavit.

Ouch… And then the claim that no County money was spent by the Cold Case Posse? Why was Brian provided with an unmarked police cruiser and county gas key card?

Exposing the Myths – Sovereign Citizens – Liens and 18 U.S.C. § 1521

One of the favorite methods of some Sovereign Citizens is to use liens to harass those who refuse to take them seriously. Thus, we have seen examples of such ‘liens’ filed against Judges, IRS agents and other government officials.

Congress put an end to this harassment by passing 18 USC 1521

Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to file, in any public record or in any private record which is generally available to the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an individual described in section 1114, on account of the performance of official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that such lien or encumbrance is false or contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.

Over time, this statute has been successfully applied to many cases, starting with the sentencing of a member/founder of the so-called “Montana Freeman Militia”:

Exposing the Myth – Sovereign Citizens – Lansing v Smith

“It will be admitted on all hands that with the exception of the powers granted to the states and the federal government through the Constitutions, the people of the several states are unconditionally sovereign within their respective states.” [Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wendell 9, (NY) 6 How416, 14 L. Ed. 997].

What the Sovereign Citizens forget is that the people refers to the collective not the individual. This is clear in the Supreme Court case Shively v. Bowlby – 152 U.S. 1 (1894) which cites Lansing v Smith

In New York, it was long considered as settled law that the state succeeded to all the rights of the Crown and Parliament  of England in lands under tidewaters, and that the owner of land bounded by a navigable river within the ebb and flow of the tide had no private title or right in the shore below high water mark, and was entitled to no compensation for the construction, under a grant from the legislature of the state, of a railroad along the shore between high and low water mark, cutting off all access from his land to the river, except across the railroad. Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21; Gould v. Hudson River Railroad, 6 N.Y. 522; People v. Tibbetts, 19 N.Y. 523, 528; People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 467; Langdon v. New York, 93 N.Y. 129, 144, 154-156; Mayor New York v. Hart, 95 N.Y. 443, 450, 451, 457;

If the case had been as the Sovereign Citizens claims, then the owner of the land would have had a viable case and would have been entitled to compensation. Until the “Sovereign Citizens” accept that their citations to the sovereignty of the people does not refer to the individual, they will continue to lose their cases in court.

Exploring the Myth – Sovereign Citizens – Murdock v Penn

Murdock v. Penn., 319 US 105, (1943) “No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and attach a fee to it.”

Check out the ruling and tell me where this quote is found?

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 – Supreme Court 1943

The case involves Jehova Witnesses who filed a lawsuit for having to pay a licensing fee to distribute their literature door to door.

The court did find that there are instances where adding a license fee may be permissible.

Jehovah’s Witnesses are not “above the law.” But the present ordinance is not directed to the problems with which the police power of the state is free to deal. It does not cover, and petitioners are not charged with, breaches of the peace. They are pursuing their solicitations peacefully and quietly. Petitioners, moreover, are not charged with or prosecuted for the use of language which is obscene, abusive, or which incites retaliation. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra. Nor do we have here, as we did in Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, state regulation of the streets to protect and insure the safety, comfort, or convenience of the public. Furthermore, the present ordinance is not narrowly drawn to safeguard the people of the community in their homes against the evils of solicitations. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 306. As we have said, it is not merely a registration ordinance calling for an identification of the solicitors so as to give the authorities some basis for investigating strangers coming into the community. And the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and at home against the abuses of solicitors.

To show a more up to date position of the Supreme Court, read the review in Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F. 3d 160 – Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2013

In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has held that governmental entities may impose licensing fees relating to the exercise of constitutional rights when the fees are designed “to meet the expense incident to the administration of the [licensing statute] and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed.” Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941) (quotation marks omitted). Put another way, imposing fees on the exercise of constitutional rights is permissible when the fees are designed to defray (and do not exceed) the administrative costs of regulating the protected activity. E. Conn. Citizens Action Grp. v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 166*166 1056 (2d Cir.1983) (“Licensing fees used to defray administrative expenses are permissible, but only to the extent necessary for that purpose.”); see Int’l Women’s Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619 F.3d 346, 370 (5th Cir.2010); Nat’l Awareness Found. v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1165 (2d Cir.1995) (“Thus, fees that serve not as revenue taxes, but rather as means to meet the expenses incident to the administration of a regulation and to the maintenance of public order in the matter regulated are constitutionally permissible.”);^[10] see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 259-61 (2d Cir.2013) (upholding a toll bridge fee as “constitutional[ly] permissib[le]” in the “right to travel” context); cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943) (striking down a license tax that was “not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question”).^[11]

Exposing the Myth – Sovereign Citizens – SHAPIRO vs. THOMSON,

SHAPIRO vs. THOMSON, 394 U. S. 618 April 21, 1969 . Further, the Right to TRAVEL by private conveyance for private purposes upon the Common way can NOT BE INFRINGED. No license or permission is required for TRAVEL when such TRAVEL IS NOT for the purpose of [COMMERCIAL] PROFIT OR GAIN on the open highways operating under license IN COMMERCE.

Now let’s look at this case and you tell me where this text can be found?

It does express that the right to travel is a fundamental right, but that does not mean that one cannot place reasonable limitations on certain methods of travel.

“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.”

It also observes

Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the waiting period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause. [Footnote 21]

Footnote 21 reads:

We imply no view of the validity of waiting period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.

Sloppy. Who has found these cases and why has noone done proper research into them?

Debunking the Myth – Sovereign Citizens – State Citizens and Immunity

The Sovereign Citizens often cite the following:

“The state citizen is immune from any and all government attacks and procedure, absent contract.” see, Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 or as the Supreme Court has stated clearly, “…every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowmen without his consent.”

CRUDEN vs. NEALE, 2 N.C. 338 2 S.E. 70

So far, the first citation cannot be found online and Dred Scott v Sandford does not contain it. In Cruden v Neale, which is not a Supreme Court case but rather a Superior Court Case in Wilmington NC, decided in 1796. The date is important since the issue involves the question of citizenship during the transition from British Rule to US Rule. The poorly documented ‘decisions’ which appear to be either invented or erroneously referenced, continue to show the lack of foundation behind the Sovereign Movement.

The closest Dred Scott comes to supporting their position is, when it talks about the free negro.

When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States as members of the community which constituted the State, and were not numbered among its “people or citizens.” Consequently, the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to them. And not being “citizens” within the meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has not jurisdiction in such a suit.

Of course, Congress passed the 14th Amendment to, once and for all, lay to rest these issues.

And so the myth of the “Sovereign Citizen” continues to be shaken because of its poor foundation in law, history and fact. It is this kind of ignorance that guarantees the failures of the “Common Law Grand Jury”.

If the “Common Law Gran Jury’ wants to succeed, it has to show that it can exist outside of the statutes and rules which indicate that only the Attorney General may bring cases to the Grand Jury. Until they accept the concept of Standing as an intricate part of our Constitution, they will continue to fail. Until they accept that the right to petition is not the same as the right to have the petition being granted or heard, they will continue to remain irrelevant.

I am all in favor of an informed public, correctly informed, who involves itself in matters of public policy, but the “Common Law Grand Jury” appears to be nothing more than an attempt by some disgruntled people to have their cases (re)-heard in court.

Debunking the myths – NY “Common Law Grand Jury” – Quo Warranto

The self proclaimed ‘NY Common Law Grand Jury’ has issued quo warranto and have claimed to have issued ‘true bills’ for indictment. Of course, they lack the legal foundation to be able to issue indictments, and they lack the legal foundation to file a complain of Quo Warranto

Quo Warranto in NY State, the courts have found that the action should be initiated by the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of this Court and dismissed the proceeding on the ground that the exclusive remedy was a plenary action in the nature of quo warranto commenced by the attorney general pursuant to Executive Law § 63-b (see Matter of Delgado v Sunderland, 97 NY2d 420 [2002]; Matter of Hanington v Coveney, 62 NY2d 640 [1984]). Hockley took office on March 15, 2002, one day after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision.

Source: People v Delgado 2003 NY Slip Op 18444 [1 AD3d 72] November 17, 2003

Under these circumstances, the proper vehicle for challenging the results and contesting title to the public office of the purported winner is a quo warranto action, now codified in Executive Law § 63-b (see People ex rel. McLaughlin v Board of Police Commrs. of City of Yonkers, 174 N.Y. 450 [1903]). The power to commence a quo warranto action is vested in the Attorney General, to be used only after the alleged “usurper” has taken office (see Executive Law § 63-b). In exercising this power, the Attorney General performs an investigative and screening function on such challenges (see Morris v Cahill, 96 A.D.2d 88, 91 [1983] [op by Levine, J.]), and is presumed to afford a claimant a full opportunity to assert a legal right, if any exists (see Matter of Gardner, 68 N.Y. 467, 470 [1877]). The exclusivity of quo warranto in these circumstances also avoids the risk of leaving the contested office vacant for possibly a protracted period while the election result is being litigated through the courts to a final conclusion (see Matter of Hearst v Woelper, 183 N.Y. 274, 284 [1905]; Seavey v Van Hatten,

Source:  MTR. OF DELGADO v. SUNDERLAND 97 N.Y.2d 420 (2002) 767 N.E.2d 662 741 N.Y.S.2d 171

Interview with a “Common Law Grand Jury” hopeful

A very interesting overview of the “Common Law Grand Jury”

Good questions… And lousy answers.

The “Common Law Grand Jury” is doomed to failure.

And they still cite Scalia’s ruling, totally misunderstanding it. Hilarious…

So they sent a declaration to the Courts and the Courts will ignore it, then what… Nothing will happen. The “Common Law Grand Jury” is nothing more than a group of like-minded people petitioning the Courts.

Getting into the courts is a completely different process… Duh….

The Courts have set aside or ignored the petitions… Wow, a great success…

As a practical manner, what can you do? Blah, blah, blah. Citing Article VI of the NY State Constitution… Yawn… Such a random argument.

Of course, the Common Law Grand Jury will complain and nothing will happen.

They do not believe in standing or course of actions. Common law: Injury requires remedy… Hilarious ignorance. Injury is what also defines the legal system’s concept of standing, but the injury has to be real and specific not general.

They are confusing the right to petition for redress of grievances with a right for redress of grievances.

The reported declined to pursue the story as there was really none.

Those poor “Common Law Grand Jury” people

They spam the police Fax with meaningless drivel and then receive a fax telling them to no longer send faxes to a list of phone numbers. It’s good that one can stop these commercial spam forms of harassment.

The “Common Law Grand Jury” was not happy and decided to ‘educate’ the police and others as to the meaning of the Constitution.

Enjoy and laugh a little

They see themselves as sovereigns and the boss of those who run out Government. Sorry my friends that is not how our system works. While the “common law grand jury” is a growing phenomenon, it will quickly wither away when the courts and others keep ignoring it and treating it for what it really is: a group of concerned citizens.

Debunking the SovCit myths – Christy v Elliot –

The Sovereign Citizen movement cites, in support of their beliefs that they need no driver license or registration for their motor vehicle, a case which was decided in 1905 when automobiles had barely entered into US lives.

Speeding, running stop signs, traveling without license plates, or registration are not threats to the public safety, and thus are not arrestable offenses.

Source: Christy v. Elliot,216 Ill. 31, 74 NE 1035, 216 Il. 31 – 1905

This is a case in the State of Illinois. While I have yet to find the case online, several cites cause me to doubt the interpretation given to this case. And the more I have read the more I believe that they have grossly misunderstood the case. One also does not really see the case cited in any recent court cases, which leads me to suspect that rulings have not gone the way of the Sovereign Citizen.