Poor Darren, again he falls victim to poor advice and understanding of issues of law. He was written up for “insolence towards a staff member” of the Texarkana prison. He claims freedom of speech as an unalienable right, even for prisoners…
Come now the Undersigned Darren Wesley Huff, the REAL PARTY OF INTEREST (Fed R Civ Proc Rule 17), a non corporate, natural born, living, breathing and sentient, on the land, with clean hands, [r]ectus in curia, and demands DISMISSAL of these charges for this court’s lack of jurisdiction of this Personum… Darren Welsey Huff, who is an Authorized Representative of DARREN WESLEY HUFF, the corporate entity in this case. The Undersigned asserts that Texarkana FCI is a corporate entity and can only adjudicate another corporate entity, not the flesh and blood, living, breathing, sentient being Darren Wesley Huff.
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Darren Huff also quotes 28 USC 2072 which talks about rules of the court. He totally ignores the context of the statute which reads:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
Juror (n) – T.C.A. 39-16-101(1) ”Juror” means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court of this state or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury. “Juror” also includes any person who has been summoned or whose name has been drawn to attend as a prospective juror;
 In Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78 – Supreme Court 1987, the Supreme Court upheld the restrictions on speech imposed by the Missouri Division of Corrections.
We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules. Applying that standard, we uphold the validity of the correspondence regulation, but we conclude that the marriage restriction cannot be sustained.
The lower court and Appeal’s court had concluded that under strict scrutiny, the correspondence regulation could be justified “only if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and the limitation is no greater than necessary or essential to protect that interest.”
In none of these four “prisoners’ rights” cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is “reasonably related” to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an “exaggerated response” to those concerns.
See also King v. CHESTER COUNTY PRISON, Dist. Court, ED Pennsylvania 2012
A prison regulation that “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights . . . is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
and Al-Amin v. Smith, Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2008
The Turner Court identified four factors in determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation: (1) a “‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives” to the regulation. Id. at 89-90, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.Post-Turner, this Court has accorded “wide-ranging” and “substantial” deference to prisoner administrators in their execution of policies and practices that they consider necessary to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999); Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509-10 (11th Cir. 1996). Such deference is justified because of “the complexity of prison management, the fact that responsibility therefor is necessarily vested in prison officials, and the fact that courts are ill-equipped to deal with such problems.” Lawson, 85 F.3d at 510. Before we apply Turner’s factors to the mail-opening issue here, we review the post-Turner split in other circuits about this issue.