STATE OF TENNESSEE v . ANTHONY TROY WILLIAMS – Appeal

Anthony Troy Williams was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, second offense and convicted by a Jury to 6 month jail and a $2500 fine.

Williams argued that he has a constitutional right to travel and that therefore any attempt require him to possess a driver’s license would be unconstitutional. The court, observing that the right to travel does not mean the right to travel using any and all means stated:

This Court agrees with Appellant’s contention that he enjoys a fundamental right to freedom of travel. See Booher, 978 S.W.2d at 955.
[NBC:
The court in Booher found:
His right to travel within this state or to points beyond its boundaries remains unimpeded. Thus, not only has the appellant’s right to freedom of travel not been infringed, but also, we cannot conclude that this right is even implicated in this case. Rather, based upon the context of his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. This notion is wholly separate from the right to travel.]
However, Appellant’s right to travel has not been infringed upon by the requirement by our legislature that an individual have a valid driver’s license to lawfully operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. Id. at 955-56. The same holds true for the requirement that motor vehicles be registered under the motor vehicle registration law. See id. at 956. Arguments identical to Appellant’s have been addressed and dismissed by this Court several times. See, e.g., State v. Paul Williams, No. W2009-02179-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2539699, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 23, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2010); State v. David A. Ferrell, No. M2007-01306-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2425963, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 7, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2010); State v. Bobby Gene Goodson, No. E2001-00925-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1751191, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Knoxville, July 29, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 23, 2002). Appellant is not entitled to relief.

The Hawaiian “Walt”?

Funny… Totally unsupported by any legal arguments. Trying to argue that under common law, they have a right to arrest a person and serve a warrant. Fascinating failures to understand the law in these matters. This matter came from the “common court”, ROTFL.

As to failure to understand HRS 1.1

     §1-1  Common law of the State; exceptions.  The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State. [L 1892, c 57, §5; am L 1903, c 32, §2; RL 1925, §1; RL 1935, §1; RL 1945, §1; RL 1955, §1-1; HRS §1-1]

MD – Taitz v Colvin – Response to plaintiff’s response

03/02/2014 32 REPLY to Response to Motion re 28 MOTION to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Carolyn Colvin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Loucks, Allen) (Entered: 03/02/2014)
Orly’s reading abilities continue to trip her up, for example

In support of allegation 2, Plaintiff submitted Opposition Exhibit 1, SSA’s November 16, 2012 FOIA response to a different FOIA request for Mr. Bounel’s information. In this response, SSA states that “the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) restricts disclosure of the [requested] information.” Plaintiff argues that this letter proves that SSA has located records for Mr. Bounel. However, the November 16, 2012 FOIA response does not state SSA located any records for Mr. Bounel. In addition, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge a material difference in the 2012 FOIA request and her April 26, 2013 FOIA request, which caused SSA to respond differently to the requests.

Plaintiff provides no additional relevant evidence to support her FOIA allegations. Opposition Exhibits 2-3 include copies of records of a deceased individual’s SSN, who Plaintiff asserts should appear in SSA’s records immediately before the records of Mr. Bounel. However, Plaintiff did not request the records of this individual in her April 26, 2013 FOIA request. Further, the existence of this individual’s records does not prove the existence of records for Mr. Bounel. In addition, Opposition Exhibit 4 is an Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions from an unrelated case, which is irrelevant to this case.

FL – Common Law Grand Jury

Florida statute

2.01 Common law and certain statutes declared in force.—The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state.

In other words, since the acts of the legislature of Florida has dealt with the grand jury, and since the Federal rules also provide for the Grand Jury, there is clearly no foundation for a common law grand jury in Florida.

FL – Marion County – Common Law Grand Jury – Jan 21 2014

Patrick Cranwill, <<address removed>>, addressed the board in regard to the Common Law Grand Jury

Administrators.
He stated five citizens were in attendance to speak regarding this subject and questioned if it was possible to yield their time to just one speaker. Chairman Zalak concurred. Mr. Cranwill presented a 6 page handout for the record entitled, “Writ of Mandamus the Common Law Grand Jury for Marion County, Florida”. Sean Peete, State Road 19, Salt Springs, referred to the Writ of Mandamus, which he read, in its entirety, into the record.
In response to a question by Commissioner Bryant, Mr. Minter advised that the United States (US) and Florida Constitutions provided for Grand Juries, noting there was no authority in either Constitution that allowed for a group of citizens to appoint themselves as a Grand Jury. He referred to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(a), which stated in part, “the US Court appoints a Grand Jury for Federal Court” and
Florida Statute (FS) 905.011, which stated in part that “Grand Juries were appointed in the same fashion as a Trial Jury”. Mr. Minter clarified that the only Grand Juries recognized in Florida were those that were appointed according to Florida Statutes..
Clerk Ellspermann advised that the organization recently approached him with regard to their requests, noting by the authority of Florida law he could not provide them space at the Marion County Courthouse. He noted the Boards legal advisor to the Grand Jury was the State Attorney.
(Ed. Note: This matter was again addressed later in the meeting.)
Judicial Center/Suits
– County Attorney Minter addressed previous comments regarding the Common Law Grand Jury, noting some of those organizations were made up of citizens who felt disenfranchised with their trust in government. He stated it was important to help citizens understand that government, at the State and local levels, was there for them and was responsive to their requests.
(Ed. Note: This matter was again addressed later in the meeting.)

FL – Marion County – Common Law Grand Jury

Some people have informed the Marion County Board of Commissioners that they expect that their ‘common law grand jury’ will receive $1.5M in funding, and other benefits. The board is not impressed and thus people keep showing up to lament about the Bar Association, Common Law Grand Jury and so on. The Board is still not impressed and for good reason

At the FogBow, Mimi reports on the latest “progress

Pat Cranwill, one of the group’s leaders, said Tuesday that commissioners were obligated to honor the demand as part of their oath to uphold the Constitution.

Cranwill then rattled off a list of 13 “crimes” that citizens of Marion County are being subjected to by their government that the grand jury would address.

Another member, Rose Charboneau, said the acts of “pretended government” would “no longer be tolerated.”

And while the grand jury was not investigating anyone at this point, she added, the group was observing and gathering information “which may come into play in the future.”

Commissioners again did not respond immediately to the group’s ultimatum.

Things did get somewhat tense when two deputies, at the request of Chairman Zalak, started to remove Hagan Smith, who identified himself as the Florida coordinator for the group, after Smith refused to give his address before speaking.

Board Meeting Feb 18, 2014

With video – At 16:33 the first Common Law Grand Jury speaker starts.

Patrick Cranwill – Common Law Grand Jury
Sean Peete – Common Law Grand Jury
Hagan Smith – Common Law Grand Jury 
Charles Reed – Common Law Grand Jury
Rose Charboneau – Common Law Grand Jury

More on Hagan Smith

Florida has a new statute that allows the courts to more properly deal with these kinds of requests

Clerk of the Circuit Court David Ellspermann told the commission that he was referring the grand jury’s presentation to State Attorney Brad King for possible prosecution under a new state law.

That law, enacted last year, allows prosecutors to charge someone who “simulates” the “legal process” to intimidate, harass or hinder public officials while performing their official duties.

US v Rodney Class – USDC DC – Indictment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Holding a Criminal Term
Grand Jury Sworn in on May 7, 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RODNEY CLASS,
Defendant.

VIOLATIONS:

40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (Unlawful Possession of a Firearm on Capitol Grounds or Buildings)
22 D.C. Code § 4504(a) (2001 ed.) (Carrying a Pistol (Outside Home or Place of Business))

I N DI C T M E N T

The Grand Jury charges that:

COUNT ONE

On or about May 30, 2013, within the District of Columbia, RODNEY CLASS, did carry on or have readily accessible, firearms, that is, a Taurus .44 caliber pistol, a Ruger LC9 9mm pistol, and a Henry Arms .44 caliber rifle, on the United States Capitol Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings.

(Unlawful Possession of a Firearm on Capitol Grounds or Buildings, in violation of Title 40, United States Code, Section 5104(e)(1))

COUNT TWO

On or about May 30, 2013, within the District of Columbia, RODNEY CLASS, did carry, openly and concealed on or about his person, in a place other than his dwelling place, place of business or on other land possessed by him, a pistol.

(Carrying a Pistol (Outside Home or Place of Business)), in violation of, 22 D.C. Code, Section 4504(a) (2001 ed.))

Attorney of the United States in and for the District of Columbia.

Rodney Class – Firearms.

Class was arrested by Capitol police when he told them that he had firearms in his illegally parked car on the Capitol grounds in DC.

Class argues that a firearm does not include the weapons he had in his car. The definition of firearm is found in 18 USC 921

(3) The term “firearm” means

(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;
(B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon;
(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or
(D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm.

DC v Class – Docket – Dismissed

Rodney Class’s DC Court case which was dismissed and refiled in Federal Court. Class was arrested and brought before this court for a bond hearing. His federal charges were two counts. The first one was a title 40  section 5104(e)(1) charge of possessing a firearm on Capitol grounds, the other charge involved 22 DC Code 4504 “Carrying a pistol outside home, place or business”

40 USC 5104

(e) Capitol Grounds and Buildings Security.—

(1) Firearms, dangerous weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices.— An individual or group of individuals—

(A) except as authorized by regulations prescribed by the Capitol Police Board—

(i) may not carry on or have readily accessible to any individual on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, a dangerous weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device;
(ii) may not discharge a firearm or explosives, use a dangerous weapon, or ignite an incendiary device, on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings; or
(iii) may not transport on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings explosives or an incendiary device; or
(B) may not knowingly, with force and violence, enter or remain on the floor of either House of Congress.
No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed. Whoever violates this section shall be punished as provided in § 22-4515, except that:
1
A person who violates this section by carrying a pistol, or any deadly or dangerous weapon, in a place other than the person’s dwelling place, place of business, or on other land possessed by the person, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both; or
2
If the violation of this section occurs after a person has been convicted in the District of Columbia of a violation of this section or of a felony, either in the District of Columbia or another jurisdiction, the person shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
a-1
Except as otherwise permitted by law, no person shall carry within the District of Columbia a rifle or shotgun. A person who violates this subsection shall be subject to the criminal penalties set forth in subsection (a)(1) and (2) of this section.
b
No person shall within the District of Columbia possess a pistol, machine gun, shotgun, rifle, or any other firearm or imitation firearm while committing a crime of violence or dangerous crime as defined in § 22-4501. Upon conviction of a violation of this subsection, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed 15 years and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a mandatory-minimum term of not less than 5 years and shall not be released on parole, or granted probation or suspension of sentence, prior to serving the mandatory-minimum sentence.
And yes, the case was dismissed in the State Court and he did not transfer. Poor Class believes that the court found him not-guilty.

2013 CF2 009225: District of Columbia Vs. CLASS, RODNEY D

Case Type: Felony II
File Date: 05/31/2013
Status: Closed
Status Date: 05/31/2013
Disposition: Dismissed
Disposition Date: 09/04/2013
Party Name Party Alias(es) Party Type Attorney(s)
CLASS, RODNEY D CLASS, RODENY DALE Defendant (Criminal) DWORSKY, Mr DONALD L

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The Myth of the Sheriff…

Some people have ‘argued’ that the Sheriff in our nation holds a special role. The court in Delaware found that historically speaking the role was in support of the court and involved the delivery of subpoenas and other administrative work. Any law enforcement roles were merely incidental. A good historical overview is given of the role of the Sheriff.

Because the common law arrest power of a sheriff was not fundamental, but was merely incidental, to his role as a “conservator of the peace” when the 1776, 1792, 1831, and 1897 Delaware Constitutions were adopted, the arrest power can be modified or even eliminated by statute. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed on that basis.

Source: Christopher v Sussex County, decided, October 7, 2013

Dr C – Breaking news: Taitz SSN gambit crashes and burns

A poster going by the name Rickey has posted the final nail in the coffin of Harry Bounel, who had been identified by Orly as the true owner of President Obama’s SSN.

The facts are that Harry Boymel (not Bounel) has a SSN 080-18-6078 which is nothing close to President Obama’s SSN.

Will Orly inform all the courts of her mistakes?

Source: Rickey at Dr Conspiracy

MS – Orly v Democrat Party – Reply to opposition in detail

With comments interspersed. Will update over time, Orly’s response is fascinating and very Orlyesque. I am not a lawyer, just my best reading.

IN THE US DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

Dr. Orly Taitz, ESQ et al
v.
Democratic Party of Mississippi et al )

CASE 12-CV-280 HON HENRY WINGATE

REPLY TO OPPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF RELEVANCE TO NEW MATERIAL FACTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ON 01.21.2013

On January 22 parties held a phone conference with Judge Wingate. During the conference Hon Judge Wingate ordered Defendants to respond within 2 weeks to January 21 “Notice of New Material Facts” filed by Plaintiff Taitz. Taitz to reply within a week after the last response. Further, this court brought to the attention of the parties a comment that Judge Wingate’s law clerk found as being posted on the web site of Orly Taitz, OrlyTaitzESQ.com, by one Virgil E. Byrd, where aforementioned Virgil Byrd made an allegation of ex-parte communication by this court and made defamatory statements. (Exhibit 1 “Virgil E. Byrd” comment.) Hon. Judge Wingate advised the parties that he will contact the US Attorney for the Southern District of MS and he will be seeking  a criminal investigation to ascertain identity of the individual who made this comment.

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MS – Taitz v Democrat Party – Docket as of 2014/02/12

U.S. District Court
Southern District of Mississippi (Northern (Jackson))
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12-cv-00280-HTW-LRA
Taitz et al v. Democrat Party of Mississippi et al
Assigned to: District Judge Henry T. Wingate
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson

Case in other court:  Circuit Court of Hinds County, Ms, 251-12-00107 CIV

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The Grand Jury and standing

In re Grand Jury Application, 617 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.1985) is often used to argue that the US attorney shall on request of any person, forward such information to the Grand Jury. The problem with such is that it can only be enforced by the Court if the plaintiff has standing to raise the issue. This requires the plaintiff to have standing to enforced the duty.

Mohwish’s request that his evidence be presented to the grand jury is, unlike his other requests, at least plausible. Section 3332 says on its face that the U.S. Attorney “shall” present to the grand jury information provided by “any person,” and one district court has held that any person has standing to enforce this duty. See In re Grand Jury Application, 617 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (granting mandamus to enforce § 3332); see also Simpson, 902 F.Supp. at 254 (dictum). In our view, however, Mohwish does not have standing to enforce the statute.

In order to have standing to sue in federal court, Article III of the Constitution of the United States requires that a complainant have suffered an injury in fact, which the Supreme Court has defined as the invasion of a concrete, imminent, and legally cognizable interest. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2143 n. 8, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (individual can enforce procedural rights only if “the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing”). A legally cognizable interest means an interest recognized at common law or specifically recognized as such by the Congress. See id. at 578, 112 S.Ct. at 2145 (noting that the Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law”).

See also Sibley v Obama

Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Sibley also seeks mandamus to require Machen to inform the grand jury of plaintiff’s identity and President Obama’s alleged wire fraud, as well as to reveal what action or recommendation was taken regarding this entreaty. The Court will deny the mandamus request, in keeping with prior decisions 22*22 that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 cannot be enforced by private individuals. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wainstein, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 16026, at *2 (D.C.Cir.June 22, 2006). Per § 1332, an individual may request that the U.S. Attorney present evidence of alleged offenses to the grand jury; but that does not directly benefit plaintiff, so it does not create Article III standing to enforce particular action by the U.S. Attorney. Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069-70 (D.C.Cir.1997).

MS – Orly v Democrat Party – Reply to opposition

Notice of Electronic Filing
The following transaction was entered on 2/12/2014 at 2:55 PM CST and filed on 2/12/2014
Case Name: Taitz et al v. Democrat Party of Mississippi et al
Case Number: 3:12-cv-00280-HTW-LRA
Filer: Orly Taitz
Document Number: 104
Docket Text:

Reply to Opposition and in Support of Relevance to New Material Facts submitted to the Court on 1/21/2013, filed by Orly Taitz. (Attachments: # (1) Exhibit 1 – Virgil E. Byrd comment, # (2) Exhibit 2 – American Thinker Article, # (3) Exhibit 3 – 7/18/2013 Text Order)(ND)