Recent Rulings Definition Natural Born Citizen
Sterngard Friegen’s friend has provided the following String Cite, defining in legal terms the findings by the various courts, which help establish the eligibility of President Obama
Natural Born & Native Born
From our friend Ballantine
“I propose to insert before the word “citizen” the word “natural-born;” so that it will read: “The right of natural-born citizens of the United States to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” If that amendment is adopted it will not be competent for Congress or for any State to discriminate against any person born in the United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude ; but the States may discriminate as against foreign-born persons. Adopt this amendment of mine and the States of California and Oregon would be able to provide that any persons born in China or Japan should not exercise political power in those States, but California or Oregon could not provide that any person born in the United States, no matter what his color might be, sbonld be deprived of the elective franchise or the right to hold office; so that the effect of this amendment would be that it would leave it with the States to declare that persons born in Asia or in Africa should not exercise political power within the several States.”
Source: Senator Williams, The congressional globe, Volume 61, Part 2. pg. 938 (1869)
And many more….
Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356
Borderraven argued that the Court in US v Wong Kim Ark required the parents to be permanently domiciled in the United States but the Court’s references do not lead to such a narrow interpretation. Remember that the requirement is ‘subject to jurisdiction’ and the Court referenced Yick Wo v Hopkins to observe that those who are resident (temporarily or permanently) are entitled to the protection of our Laws and thus ‘subject to our Jurisdiction’
Those subjects of the Emperor of China who have the right to temporarily or permanently reside within the United States, are entitled to enjoy the protection guaranteed by the Constitution and afforded by the laws.
Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are ” subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356; Law Ow Bew v. United States144 U.S. 47, 61, 62; Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893), 149 U.S. 698, 724;Lem Moon Sing v. United States (1893), 158 U.S. 538, 547; Wong Wing v. United States (1896), 163 U.S. 228, 238.
Miller v. Albright, 523 US 420 – Supreme Court 1998
The majority opinion observes that:
There are “two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.” United States v.Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702 (1898). Within the former category, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that every person “born in the United States, and subject to the 424*424 jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.” 169 U. S., at 702. Persons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as provided by Acts of Congress. Id., at 703.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
I recognize that, ever since the Civil War, the transmission of American citizenship from parent to child, jus sanguinis, has played a role secondary to that of the transmission of citizenship by birthplace, jus soli. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S., at 828; see also Weedin v. Chin Bow,274 U. S. 657, 669-671 (1927) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 674 (1898), and id., at 714 (Fuller, C. J., dissenting)). That lesser role reflects the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not mention statutes that might confer citizenship “at birth” to children of Americans 479*479 born abroad. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1 (stating that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens”). But that omission, though it may give Congress the power to decide whether or not to extend citizenship to children born outside the United States, see Rogers v. Bellei, supra, at 835, does not justify more lenient “equal protection” review of statutes that embody a congressional decision to do so.
Citizenship and the 14th Amendment – Debate
Two legal experts discuss the question if the US Constitution grants citizenship to anyone born on US soil. Edward J. Erler, from the Claremont Institution, a conservative think tank, and Garrett Epps, Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore. Erler makes the argument against and Epps quickly exposes some major flaws in the accuracy of Erler’s comments. Since I have seen several people on this forum make similarly confused argument, it would serve them well to read the 4 postings in this debate carefully.
Matthew Ing – Birthright Citizenship, Illegal Aliens, and the Original Meaning of the Citizenship Clause
Birthright Citizenship, Illegal Aliens, and the Original Meaning of the Citizenship Clause
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is typically understood as granting birthright citizenship to U.S.-born children of illegal aliens. This view, however, is disputed by “consensualists” who argue that the original meaning of the Clause’s qualifier, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” would have excluded such children. This “consensualist interpretation,” however, is incorrect on originalist grounds. Evidence from before, during, and after the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment demonstrates that the Citizenship Clause’s original meaning is consistent with birthright citizenship for illegal aliens’ children
By Virtue of Being Born Here’: Birthright Citizenship and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
This Article responds to recent claims that as an originalist matter, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover children of undocumented immigrants; it shows this interpretation, whatever its political and popular support, to be wrong on its own historical terms. The Citizenship Clause was instead originally understood to guarantee citizenship for all children born here and subject at birth to the full unmediated sovereign power of the United States, whatever the immigration status of their parents. The Article reaches this conclusion through examining evidence that has not been fully considered before: the debates over the citizenship provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Citizenship Clause was enacted in order to entrench the citizenship guarantee of the Civil Rights Act. The debates over that guarantee show that Congressional Republicans drafted it to repudiate the consent-based citizenship approach of Dred Scott in favor of the traditional territorial approach of the common law. The Amendment’s restriction of birthright citizenship to children born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States was historically understood to exclude only individuals, such as children of foreign diplomats and of members of Indian tribes, outside the scope of full U.S. sovereign authority. All other children are included within the Amendment’s guarantee of birthright citizenship, including children of undocumented immigrants.
Source: Shawhan, Mark, ‘By Virtue of Being Born Here’: Birthright Citizenship and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (September 1, 2011). Harvard Latino Law Review, Vol. 15, 2012.
James Ho – Defining “American” Birthright Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment
James Ho lays to rest many of the myths surrounding the passage of the 14th Amendment and addresses some of the common confusions
These proposals raise serious constitutional questions, however. Birthright citizenship is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That birthright is protected no less for children of undocumented persons than for descendants of Mayflower passengers.The Fourteenth Amendment begins: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” Repeal proponents contend that this language does not apply to the children of aliens – whether legal or illegal (with the possible exception of lawful permanent residents) – because such persons are not “subject to [U.S.] jurisdiction.” But text, history, judicial precedent, and Executive Branch interpretation confirm that the Citizenship Clause reaches most U.S.-born children of aliens, including illegal aliens.
The meaning of the term Natural Born Citizen – Part 1
The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born subjects.
Source: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1:354, 357–58, 361—62 (1765)
So either you are born outside the dominion of a king and thus an alien or a natural-born subject by virtue of birth on soil.
Educating the Confused – Natural born and status of parents
In Diaz-Salazar v. I.N.S., 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1983), the Court observed that the children born to Diaz-Salazar, who had illegally entered the United States, were natural born citizens.
The petitioner has a wife and two children under the age of three in Chicago; the children are natural-born citizens of the United States.
Educating the Confused – e.vattel on Nationality of Moses
![MPj04394090000[1]](http://nativeborncitizen.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/mpj043940900001.jpg?w=519 "MPj04394090000[1]")
e.vattel, perhaps unfamiliar with the Bible and the Biblical traditions ‘argues’ to the best of his abilities that:
Does Natural Born mean Born to two US citizens? Nope
Check out
Including Wong Kim Ark for Dummies, Quotations from the 39th Congress related to the 14th Amendment and books on Google that define natural born citizenship.
Government Brief: The question presented by this appeal may be thus stated: Is a person born within the United States of alien parents domiciled therein a citizen thereof by the fact of his birth? The appellant maintains the negative, and in that behalf assigns as error the ruling of the district court that the respondent is a natural-born citizen… (p.2)
Dissenting Judge: Considering the circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution, I submit that it is unreasonable to conclude that “natural-born citizen” applied to everybody born within the geographical tract known as the United States, irrespective of circumstances, and that the children of foreigners, happening to be born to them while passing through the country, whether of royal parentage or not, or whether of the Mongolian, Malay or other race, were eligible to the Presidency, while children of our citizens, born abroad, were not.
Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are “natural born Citizens” for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Just as a person “born within the British dominions [was] a natural-born British subject” at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, so too were those “born in the allegiance of the United States [] natural-born citizens.”15
Lynch v Clarke – Vattel
In Lynch v Clarke, Julia Lynch claimed to be a native born citizen, even though born to two British parents domiciled in Ireland. They stayed in New Your from 1815-1819, during which Julia was born. Julia’s father had made claims that it was never his intent to stay in New York but that he would return to Ireland. There was never any stated intent to become a US citizen.
Ballantine’s Natural Born Citizenship Research and Mario
An excellent resource which lays to rest any foolishness about appeal to Vattel.
Including Wong Kim Ark for Dummies, Quotations from the 39th Congress related to the 14th Amendment and books on Google that define natural born citizenship. When Apuzzo was confronted by the research he insisted that
Minor’s natural law and law of nations (not English common law) definition of a “natural born citizen” was recognized and confirmed in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), which used English common law to answer the question raised by Minor of whether a child born in the U.S. to alien parents was a “citizen.” Wong Kim Ark also recognized that children born in the U.S. to citizen parents were “natural born citizen” while children born in the U.S. to alien parents were just “citizens.”
Even though the issue raised by the Government was “did the lower Court err in finding Wong Kim Ark to be a natural born citizen” and even though the dissenting Judge lamented that under the ruling children born on US soil to alien parents could run for President.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution, I submit that it is unreasonable to conclude that “natural-born citizen” applied to everybody born within the geographical tract known as the United States, irrespective of circumstances, and that the children of foreigners, happening to be born to them while passing through the country, whether of royal parentage or not, or whether of the Mongolian, Malay or other race, were eligible to the Presidency, while children of our citizens, born abroad, were not.
Source: US v Wong Kim Ark, Dissenting Opinion
And any reasonable reading shows that Wong Kim Ark observed that the Constitution recognizes two kinds of citizens: Natural Born and Naturalized and that since Wong Kim Ark could not be naturalized, he could only be a citizen if he were a natural born. Based on Common Law, the Court indeed found that Wong Kim Ark was a citizen.
Fascinating interpretation of Wong Kim Ark which goes against scholars, legal rulings, who have quite consistently support that children born on US soil, regardless of the citizenship of the parents, are indeed natural born.
van Dyne – Citizenship on Common Law Doctrine and Natural Born
1 Common law doctrine There is no uniform rule of international law covering the subject of citizenship. Every nation determines for itself who shall, and who shall not, be its citizens. According to the law of some states, citizenship by birth depends upon the place of birth. This is the jus soli or common law doctrine. According to the law of other states, citizenship depends upon the nationality of the parents. This is the jus sanguinis sometimes erroneously termed the doctrine of the law of nations because it obtains in many countries. In some countries both elements exist the one or the other however predominating By the law of the United States citizenship depends generally on the place of birth nevertheless the children
SCOTUS and Natural Born
253 U.S. 454 (1920)
KWOCK JAN FAT
v.
WHITE, AS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AT THE PORT OF SAN FRANCISCO.
No. 313.[...]
It is not disputed that if petitioner is the son of Kwock Tuck Lee and his wife, Tom Ying Shee, he was born to them when they were permanently domiciled in the United States, is a citizen thereof, and is entitled to admission to the country. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. But while it is conceded that he is certainly the same person who, upon full investigation was found, in March, 1915, by the then Commissioner of Immigration, to be a natural bornAmerican citizen, the claim is that that Commissioner was deceived and that petitioner is really Lew Suey Chong, who was admitted to this country in 1909, as a son of a Chinese merchant, Lew Wing Tong, of Oakland, California.
[...]
For failure to preserve such a record for the information, not less of the Commissioner of Immigration and of the Secretary of Labor than of the courts, the judgment in this case must be reversed. It is better that many Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently excluded from his country.
Allegiance
ALLEGIANCE (Lat. alligare, to bind to), the subject’s duty of obedience to the sovereign under whose protection he is. Allegiance is correlative with protection, and the duty of allegiance is in return for and in consideration of the fact of protection. Therefore, when the sovereign can no longer protect the subject, his allegiance ceases; and on this principle the duty is discharged by conquest or by cession of the sovereign’s territory by treaty. Natural allegiance arises from the fact of birth within the territorial domain and actual protection by the sovereign. But actual allegiance is due even by an alien to the sovereign of the state in which he is; though, by comity of nations, there is an exception to this rule in favor of foreign sovereigns and ambassadors and their suites, and of the officers and crews of foreign war ships, and of foreign armies when they are permitted to pass through the state. As allegiance is the highest of the citizen’s obligations, so the violation of it is the highest of crimes, or treason. The principle that allegiance is due to the actual sovereign has been carried so far as to make nets treasons though they were done against a usurper; and Blackstone says that on this ground, after Edward IV. recovered-the crown, treasons committed against Henry VI. were capitally punished, though Henry had been declared a usurper by parliament. On the other hand, but on the same principle at common law, and until a statute was passed for their naturalization, the children of English subjects born abroad, that is, out of the king’s domain and protection, were aliens. But the most important quality attached by the common law to the doctrine of allegiance was that it was indissoluble. The principle was shortly expressed in the familiar Latin maxim, Nemo potcat crncrepatriam, “No one can abjure his country,” or renounce the fealty which he owes to his sovereign. The maxim is as old as English jurisprudence, and until the most recent period the rule has been maintained in England to its fullest extent. It has nowhere else been asserted, in modern times at least, with the same rigor with which it was enforced there; and even while it stood the acknowledged rule of the law of England, it was condemned by many of its soundest jurists. One of them, Twiss, has very lately said of it that it found no countenance in the law of nations; but was on the contrary in direct conflict with incontestable principles of that system. Observing the more liberal tone of modern public law upon this subject, it is worth notice that it is now asserting only the doctrine which was maintained by the law of Rome in its best period. In his argument for Balbus Cicero declared it to be even the firmest foundation of Roman liberty that the citizen might retain or renounce his allegiance at his pleasure. But the English common law asserted that allegiance intrinsic and absolute arose from the mere fact of birth within the sovereign’s dominion and protection; that it could not be cancelled or forfeited by any change of time, place, or circumstances; that the subject could not abjure it or renounce it by abandoning the realm, nor by swearing loyalty to another state; nor could it be released in any way without the concurrence of the supreme legislative power. Coke expressed the rigor of the rule as it was held in England in his time, and indeed for more than two centuries afterward, when he said that “all subjects are equally bound to their allegiance as if they had token the oath of it, because it is written by the finger of the law in their hearts.” As has just been said, however, this supreme duty might be .released by the consent of the sovereign. Such an assent was given, for example, in the case of the United States, when by treaty our independence was recognized by Great Britain; and after that it was several times decided in England that persons, though born here British subjects, who adhered to the new state, ceased to bo subjects of the crown and became aliens. But though steadily asserting the rule that allegiance was indissoluble, England has nevertheless practically conceded its invalidity by admitting and naturalizing foreigners into her citizenship, just as all other countries have done.—In modern times at least, no other considerable European state has enforced the theory of the common law, or at least not with the severity with which it was enforced in England. The French code declares expressly that the quality of a Frenchman is lost by naturalization in a foreign country, and France, Spain, and most of the German states have enacted laws regulating the naturalization of foreigners. The great European authorities in public law, Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and others, concede in general term the right of expatriation, qualifying it only when it is restrained by law, or when the citizen owes to his native state some already assumed but not yet discharged obligation; if, for example, he has violated the law and owes the penalty, or is invested with some public trust, or war threatens and his sovereign needs his aid; and these have been the chief modifications of the right to renounce allegiance which have been discussed in our own diplomatic correspondence upon this subject with European states. When once naturalization is admitted to be competent and right, the right of expatriation “and of renunciation of the former allegiance should seem to be implied as a necessary corollary. Naturalization means the complete adoption of a foreigner and the investing him with the actual citizenship of his adopted country. In practice it compels, as a precedent condition, his entire renunciation of his former allegiance, and the assumption by solemn oath of an exclusive fidelity to the new sovereign; and, with one or two modifications only, it gives him the same rights which he would have had if he had been born within his dominion and protection. The status which he thus receives is clearly inconsistent with any allegiance to the country of his birth. Allegiance cannot be divided, and if his original allegiance has not been utterly cancelled, then the naturalization is an empty form, and the adopted citizen has not the right to protection and citizenship which the new sovereign pretends to guarantee to him. These considerations have been brought forward in most of the cases which have arisen from time to time in the United States. In the earlier cases, however, though the courts inclined to give them their just weight, they repeatedly evaded direct decision of the question. From an historical review of all the cases which had arisen down to his time, Chancellor Kent declared the prevailing spirit of the decisions to be that, in the absence of any legislation sanctioning the abjuration of allegiance, the rule of the common law remained unaltered. But in one instance at least, as early as 1812, our government assumed a position on this question quite as advanced as it has ever taken in the cases which have arisen since that time. During the war with England then existing, the prince regent announced that every native-born Briton, taken prisoner while fighting in the American army, should be executed for treason to his lawful sovereign. Mr. Madison announced in return, that if any naturalized citizen of this country were put to death on the pretence that he was a British subject, the United States would put to death two English prisoners in retaliation. There was no further discussion on the subject, and no occasion for any. Still later, and especially within the last twenty years, cases have occurred in which foreigners naturalized here were upon their return to their native states compelled to render military service there, or were otherwise forced to assume the duties of subjects of their states of birth, and they invoked the protection of the United States by virtue of their status as American citizens. In ■1857, in the case of Ernst, a subject of Hanover, naturalized here, who on his return was forced into the Hanoverian army, Attorney General Black gave to the president a very clear and convincing opinion, in which he advised him that Ernst was an American citizen; that by the public law of the world we have the undoubted right to naturalize a foreigner, whether his natural sovereign consents to his emigration or not; and that Hanover could not justify Ernst’s arrest, even by showing that he emigrated contrary to the laws of that country, unless it could be proved that the original right of expatriation depended on the consent of the natural sovereign; and as to the last proposition, he added that he was sure that it could not be established. In a case in the same year, that of Amther, Mr. Black’s opinion was to the same effect on a reversed state of facts. Amther, a Bavarian subject, after being naturalized here, returned to Bavaria and sought to recover his original status as a citizen of that country. The authorities there doubted whether he could throw off his allegiance to this country, but the attorney general of the United States was of the clear opinion that he could; that by our law any citizen, native or naturalized, might sever his political connection with this government at his pleasure, provided it was for a purpose and at a time which were not injurious to our interests. Ho was of the opinion, therefore, that Amther might be reinstated as a citizen of Bavaria, and that, as a condition to such restitution of his citizenship, the Bavarian government was at liberty to compel him to abjure his allegiance to the United States in any form that its laws required. Doctrines quite as emphatic were pronounced by Mr. Marcy, secretary of state in 1853, in the famous case of Koszta. In a letter to the American minister to Prussia in 1859, concerning cases then in hand, Mr. Cass declared that the right of expatriation could not at this moment be doubted or denied in this country, and that the doctrine of perpetual allegiance was a relic of barbarism which was fast disappearing from Christendom. In 1866 Attorney General Stanbery declined to discuss the general question of the right of expatriation under our law, on the ground that the practice of the United States had long since rendered that question a mere abstraction. It should be observed, however, that our government, in its dealings with other nations on this subject, has not claimed that the right to renounce allegiance is absolute under all circumstances. It has been willing to concede that our naturalization did not give full rights of American citizenship to aliens whose removal from their native country bore the character of an escape or flight from civil or political obligations already fixed upon them; so that, while it would not recognize any validity in the general right to claim military service, for example, the actual performance of which had not been demanded when the foreign subject left his country, yet it would concede that there was a just force in the claim of the foreign state, when the subject had been already conscripted into the army, and had deserted from it, or had otherwise run away from actually existing obligations. The whole subject has been finally closed, so far as the law of the United States about it is concerned, by a very explicit and vigorous statute passed in July, 1868. Its preamble recites that the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that in the recognition of this principle, this government has freely received emigrants from all nations and invested them with the right of citizenship; that it is necessary for the maintenance of public peace that the claim of foreign allegiance as to such adopted citizens should be promptly and finally disavowed; and it is therefore enacted that any declaration, opinion, order, or decision of any officer of this government which denies, impairs, restricts, or questions the right of expatriation, is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the government. The statute further enacts that all naturalized citizens of the United States, while in foreign states, are entitled to and shall receive from this government the same protection of person and property that is accorded to native-born citizens in like circumstances. At last, in 1870, Great Britain by the naturalization act of that year (May 12) revised all her own laws upon alienage, expatriation, and naturalization, and for the first time in her history recognized the right of her subjects to renounce their allegiance to the crown.
Source: The American cyclopaedia: a popular dictionary of general knowledge edited by George Ripley, Charles Anderson Dana
Donofrio – Misunderstanding Howard
Leo Donofrio states (March 29, 2011)
As to the meaning of the term “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the 14th Amendment, Senator Howard stated:
“The first amendment is to section one, declaring that all “persons born in the United States and Subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the question of citizenship has been fully discussed in this body as not to need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. (Congressional Globe, 39th Congress pg. 2890 (1866))
Notice that Howard lists several classes of persons who are not citizens under the 14th Amendment:
- foreigners
- aliens
- families of ambassadors or ministers
It does not such thing, it talks about foreigner, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States. The ‘who’ refers to ‘foreigner, aliens’
As to his quote of Black
“Here none but a native can be President…A native and a naturalized American may therefore go forth with equal security over every sea and through every land under Heaven…They are both of them American citizens, and their exclusive allegiance is due to the Government of the United States. One of them never did owe fealty elsewhere, and the other, at the time of his naturalization…threw off, renounced and abjured forever all allegiance to every foreign prince, potentate, State and sovereignty whatever, and especially to that sovereign whose subject he had previously been. “
Fealty requires an oath of fealty which in our Nation has become our oath of allegiance which is sworn in our Nation when becoming a naturalized citizen. Note also how native is used, not natural born and how native is contrasted with naturalized. Sorry Leo, but your argument quickly dissembles itself.
Leo may also want to take notice of this NY Times article. Much of the same logic which allows someone to emigrate from a country which does not recognize expatriation, and to become a US naturalized citizen who is from that moment forward protected as a US citizen even when visiting his own home country, leads to the simple conclusion that even though another country may claim a child born on US soil as its citizen, there is a conflict in laws and since there is no doubt that the US has the right to determine who are its citizens, such another country has no claims on the child.
Exploring the 14th Amendment
Richievan left a comment:
NBC…you’re just wrong. The supreme court has never ruled “natural born citizen” as anything but “born in the country to parents who are citizens.” … The framers of the 14th amendment are directly quoted as defining “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as “complete jusrisdiction. owing allegiance to no other sovereignty.” Under the current Kenyan constitution, Obama can resign the Presidency today and run for President of Kenya, you think that’s what the founding fathers meant by “complete and sole allegiance?”
Yes so let me help you understand some of these terms. PS: The 14th only talks about “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”, complete and sole allegiance however are very similar terms.
The term comes from a discussion by Sen Trumbull about the need to add ‘Indians not taxed” to the law, and sadly his comments are taken out of proper context.
Again, we are fortunate to have on record the highest authority to tell us, Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, author of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the one who inserted the phrase:
[T]he provision is, that ‘all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.’ That means ‘subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.’ What do we mean by ‘complete jurisdiction thereof?’ Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means.
Trumbull explained
“How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance to the Government? Every thing that he is or has, his property and his life, may be taken by the Government of the United States in its defense, or to maintain the honor of the nation. And can it be that our ancestors struggled through a long war and set up this Government, and that the people of our day have struggled through another war, with all its sacrifices and all its desolation, to maintain it, and at last that we have got a Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the citizen, but has no power to afford him protection? Is that all that this boasted American citizenship amounts to? Go tell it, sir, to the father whose son was starved at Andersonville; or the widow whose husband was slain at Mission Ridge; or the little boy who leads his sightless father through the streets of your city, made blind by the winds and the sand of the Southern coast; or the thousand other mangled heroes to be seen on every side, that this Government, in defense of which the son and the husband fell, the father lost his eyes, and the others were crippled, had the right to call these persons to its defense, but has no right to protect the survivors or their friends in any right whatever in any of the States. Sir, it can not be. Such is not the meaning of our Constitution. Such is not the meaning of American citizenship. This Government, which would go to war to protect its meanest–I will not say citizen–inhabitant, if you please, in any foreign land, whose rights were unjustly encroached upon, has certainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own country. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.” Senator Trumbull, William Horatio Barnes, History of the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States, pg. 255 (1868)
Educating the Confused – Borderraven and natural born and native born
Borderraven asks:
Where do you find native born equals natural born?
Common logic as well as the interchangeable use of the terms when describing the eligibility clause.
A US Citizen can be naturalized, native-born or foreign born, but by the narrow definition, a natural born citizen, can only be native born to two US citizens.
There is no evidence to support the latter and in fact there is much to support just the opposite.
The mention of consuls and invading armies are mere examples of persons owing foreign loyalty.
Nope, they are example of people not under the jurisdiction of the United States, a minor though important distinction.
McCreery’s Lessee v Somerville 22 US 354 (1824) explains the difference between a Natural-born and Native-born U.S. Citizen as is to be applied with U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5,
It really does not explain much other than to observe that there are two kinds of people: naturalized or natural born. It certainly does not pretend to be making any statements about Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5. Furthermore it discusses the status of the parents and the relationship to inheritance laws.
This view is controverted by the plaintiffs, on the authority of McCreery’s Lessee v. Somerville (9 Wheat. 354), where this court had occasion to determine the meaning of the statute of 11 & 12 William III. c. 6, which, it is claimed, is, upon the present point, identical with the foregoing section in the Missouri statute of descents and distribution. It was there ruled that the English statute (in force in Maryland, from which State the case came) removed the common-law disability to claim title through an alien ancestor, but did not apply to a living alien ancestor, so as to create a title by heirship, where none would exist by the common law if the ancestor were a natural-born subject.
The same case was cited by Gordon to claim that foreign born children of US citizens are natural born but as Lohman pointed out, the appeal to the case was inappropriate as it discussed inheritance law.
Seems that Borderraven has made a similar error.
As to your Bingham quote, see <a href=”http://nativeborncitizen.wordpress.com/2010/04/15/tallbull-bingham-quote/”>here</a>
Extracts of an Opinion of Mr, Attorney General Bates, dated November 29, 1862.
We have natural-born citizens (Constitution, article 2, § 5), not made by law or otherwise, but born. And this class is the large majority ; in fact, the mass of our citizens; for all others are exceptions specially provided for by law.
Interesting, so citizens who are not natural born are provided for by law. Note also that the Attorney General is talking about birth (as opposed to the process of adoption (naturalization)).
As they become citizens in the natural way by birth, so they remain citizens during their natural lives, unless, by their own voluntary act, they expatriate themselves, and become citizens or subjects of another nation.
As we observed in Perkins v Elg for instance
For we have no law (as the French have) to decitizenise a citizen, who has become such either by the natural process of birth, or by the legal process of adoption. And in this connexion the Constitution says not one word, and furnishes not one hint, in relation to the colour or to the ancestral race of the ” natural born citizen.” Whatever may have been said in the opinions of judges and lawyers, and in State statutes, about negroes, mulattoes, and persons of colour, the Constitution is wholly silent upon that subject. The Constitution itself does not make the citizens (it is, in fact, made by them). It only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural—home-born— and provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien—foreign-born—making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former.
Natural born and home born, again used interchangeably.
And what a smart man indeed
As far as I know, Mr. Secretary, you and I have no better title to the citizenship which we enjoy than ” the accident of birth “—the fact that we appened to be born in the United States. And our Constitution, in speaking of natural-born citizens, uses no affirmative language to make them such, but only recognizes and re-affirms the universal principle, common to all nations, and as old as political society, that the people born in a country do constitute the nation, and, as individuals, are natural members of the body politic.
If this be a true principle, and I do not doubt it, it follows that every person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a citizen ; and he who would deny it must take upon himself the burden of proving some great disfranchisement strong enough to override the ” natural-born ” right as recognized by the Constitution in terms the most simple and comprehensive, and without any reference to race or colour, or any other accidental circumstance.
That nativity furnishes the rule, both of duty and of right, as between the individual and the government, is a historical and political truth so old and so universally accepted that it is needless to prove it by authority. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of those who may have doubts upon the subject, I note a few books, which, I think, cannot fail to remove all such doubts—Kent’s Com., vol. 2, part 4, sec. 25; Bl. Com., book 1, ch. 10, p. 365; 7 Co. Rep., Calvin’s case; 4 Term Rep., p. 300. Doe v. Jones ; 3 Pet. Rep., p. 246, Shanks v. Dupont; and see a very learned treatise, attributed to Mr. Binney in 2 Am. Law Reporter, 193.
Educating the Confused – Perkins v Elg 307 U. S. 325 (1939)
It is clear the Perkins v Elg is of little relevance to birthers as it shows that birth on soil makes one a citizen of the United States, regardless of the status of the parents and that even if the parents remove the child before the age of majority, the child does not lose his/her natural born citizenship status.
Perkins v Elg 307 U. S. 325 (1939)
First. On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case — that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States — the Court adverted to the
“inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.”
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p. 169 U. S. 668. As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. [Footnote 1] And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law. As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.
Second. It has long been a recognized principle in this country that, if a child born here is taken during minority to the country of his parents’ origin, where his parents resume their former allegiance, he does not thereby lose his citizenship in the United States provided that, on attaining majority he elects to retain that citizenship and to return to the United States to assume its duties
…
The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227), declared Miss Elg “to be a natural born citizen of the United States,” and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants.
Educating the Confused – Wong Kim Ark and Natural Born Citizen
Borderraven wrote:
NBC,
So, you’ve been quoting from the government’s briefs and using that to imply USA v Wong Kim Ark was a case about NBC, when the question and answer in the SCOTUS opinion, made the case about US citizen.
Well, yes, remember what I wrote?
In Re Look Tin Sing, Cir Ct D California (1884)
I published this one a while ago, still very valid.
In re Look TIN SING, on Habeas Corpus.
(Circuit Court, D. California. September 29, 1884.)
1. CITIZENSHIP ON PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES OF CHINESE PARENTS.
A person born within the United States, of Chinese’ parents residing therein, and not engaged in any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China, is a citizen of the United States.
2. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS “SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION THEREOF,” IN FIRST CLAUSE ON SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.
Persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered ; but only those who are thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, he both actual and exclusive. Persons excepted from citizenship, notwithstanding their birth or naturalization in the United States.
Educating the Confused – Borderraven and Jurisdiction part II
Borderraven seems to have failed to understand the simple rule, namely that at birth the child needs to be subject to jurisdiction of the Country. As the Judge in Wong Kim Ark showed, this excludes, by the fewest words, children born to diplomats and invading military. Since President Obama’s was neither born to a diplomat nor an invading military, he clearly was born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.
That other Countries may have a claim on him as well through secondary, jus sanguinis rules has no relevance to the simple fact that such a child is born subject to the jurisdiction of the country on which soil he is born.
That under International Law we allow a foreign Country’s embassy to be informed of when one of its citizens is arrested, does not grant said foreign nation any jurisdiction over the citizen. Said citizen remains fully subject to the laws of our Nation.
Now, treaties may affect these relationships and if Borderraven can point to any specific treaty that he believes is applicable to President Obama then I encourage him to do so, but remember that by virtue of birth on soil, a child is born under full jurisdiction of our Nation.
Under Borderraven’s ‘argument’ no child born on US soil to one or more aliens would even become a citizen, which we of course know, from legal precedent is a flawed position.
So what remains? Not much. We know that a child, even when born to alien parents on US soil, becomes a citizen of the United States, not through any naturalization processes but by virtue of US Common Law, which makes any child born on its soil, a natural born citizen.
Borderraven so far has done nothing to address these simple and straightforward facts.
Educating the Confused – Borderraven and Jurisdiction
At the time of his birth he was under joint-jurisdiction of both the US and UK. He is jus sanguinis equally US and British.
This is correct as to the UK as he was born not on UK soil. But it is wrong with respect to the United States. First of all, the concept of jus sanguinis applies, in the US only to naturalization statutes, and since President Obama was born on US soil, he could not be naturalized so he must have been born a citizen by virtue of the Common Law jus soli tradition.
Birth on soil is what guides the citizenship in the United States when it does not involve naturalization.
Now the question becomes: Was President Obama under British jurisdiction? That is only possible under the following circumstances: He was born on British soil, he was born to a foreign dignitary or diplomat, he was born to an invading military. Since none of these conditions apply, President Obama was born, as pointed out by US v Wong Kim Ark and others, under full jurisdiction of the United States.
Hope this clarifies. If not, we can explore the concept of jurisdiction as it applies here. Of course, anyone who would have read US v Wong Kim Ark would not be confused about its meaning.
Borderraven versus Perkins v Elg
Borderraven insists that the case of Perkins v Elg supports his claim that President Obama was not born a (natural born) citizen of the United States. He faces two problems here:
1. The US Constitution and Supreme Court rulings have ruled that there exist only two kinds of citizens: natural-born and natural-ized. The former gain citizenship because of their birth on soil, the latter through statutory enactment. So either President Obama was born a natural-born citizen or he was not even born a citizen.
2. Perkins v Elg observed that
First. On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case — that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States — the Court adverted to the
“inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.”
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p. 169 U. S. 668. As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. [Footnote 1] And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law.
So in other words, by virtue of birth on soil, even to alien parents, a child gains at birth citizenship, which makes the child a natural-born citizen.
Perkins v Elg further shows that a child, even if he acquires multiple citizenships, does not lose his birthright US citizenship and when reaching the age of 18, the child could decide which citizenship(s) to continue.
Second. It has long been a recognized principle in this country that, if a child born here is taken during minority to the country of his parents’ origin, where his parents resume their former allegiance, he does not thereby lose his citizenship in the United States provided that, on attaining majority he elects to retain that citizenship and to return to the United States to assume its duties.
The court quotes from varios sources
In 1906, a memorandum, prepared in the Department of State by its law officer, was sent by the Acting Secretary of State, Robert Bacon, to the German Ambassador as covering “the principles” upon which the Department had acted. In this memorandum, it was said: [Footnote 6]
“Assuming that Alexander Bohn [the father] never became a citizen of the United States, Jacob Bohn [the son] was born of German parents in the United States. According to the Constitution and laws of the United States as interpreted by the courts, a child born to alien parents in the United States is an American citizen, although such child may also be a citizen of the country of his parents according to the law of that country.”
Boehner – Hawaii declares Obama NBC – Good Enough for Me…
“The state of Hawaii has said that President Obama was born there. That’s good enough for me,” Boehner, R-Ohio, told NBC ‘s Brian Williams in an interview to air Thursday night on NBC Nightly News.
Citizenwells is not happy
Told you so…
More on the 14th Amendment and the Citizenship clause
It is clear that some people have misunderstood the relevance of the citizenship clause in the 14th Amendment. While most legal and historical authorities have correctly interpreted the clause to be merely declaratory of the citizenship rights established by the Constitution, there are some who insist on an interpretation which remains fully at odds with the intent.
Bingham’s fellow Ohioan, Senator Ben Wade first moved adoption of a clause defining citizenship. Wade treated the matter as declaratory, indicating that both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and prior law required that “every person, of whatever race or color, who was born within the United States was a citizen of the United States.” Other Republican senators articulated similar sentiments. For example, conservative Republican Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri indicated that the citizenship clause “will leave citizenship where it now is.” But Wade recognized that “the courts” had thrown a “doubt” over Republican views and proposed “to solve that doubt and put the question beyond all cavil for the present and for the future” by adopting a citizenship clause.
Senator Jacob Howard, the spokesman for the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, offered a substitute to Wade’s original proposal, which defined the Citizenship Clause as it was ultimately adopted: “All persons born [or naturalized] in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State[] wherein they reside.” Howard reiterated that the Citizenship Clause was “simply declaratory of . . . the law of the land already.”
Source: Richard Aynes, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT ITS INTERPRETATION, AKRON LAW REVIEW, 2006
This explains why initially the citizenship clause was fully absent from the 14th Amendment but added later in light of some unfortunate court decisions.
Not only is there no evidence that the intention was to naturalize at birth, but it also helps understand why in US v Wong Kim Ark, the Court observed similarly that the terminology used in the 14th Amendment, was to be declaratory of the terms natural-born citizen and the powers of naturalization, providing the only two ways to US citizenship.
In other words, the 14th Amendment citizen is nothing different from the US citizen as found in the Constitution. There has arisen a small discrepancy when the Courts have ruled that citizens naturalized under Congressional powers outside the United States, are not 14th Amendment US citizens (Rogers v Bellei).
In this light it is ironic how some, intent on ignoring our Constitution insist on quoting Sen. Howard
This is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons
Mario, in his unfortunate brief in Kerchner v Obama had inserted a spurious ‘or’ causing the phrase to read
Sen Jacob Howard (the framer who co-wrote the Fourteenth Amendment citizenship clause stating in 1866 that the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment excluded persons born in the United States who were foreigners, aliens, or who belonged to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers. Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1 st Session, May 30, 1866, p.2895, 2nd col.)).
Perhaps the unfortunate attempts to deny citizenship to children born on US soil to illegal aliens, may resolve the meaning of the term natural-born citizen once and for all.
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