The Padelford Case – Sovcit Myths

I was checking out the latest news on David Darby, a sovcit who insists that WA state’s constitution is the one which was approved by the State several years before Congress adopted a later version. I read a reference to a case in Georgia, which was mistakenly represented as being a US Supreme Court decision, in which the court claims that no private person has a right to complain by suit in court on the ground of a breach of the US Constitution. Time to put an end to this myth,

The United States Supreme Court issued a ruling denying a man the right to claim constitutional protection from “government” attack due to the fact that the “government” was exceeding its authorized jurisdiction as clearly limited within the United States Constitution. “No private person has a right to complain by suit in court on the ground of a breach of the United States constitution; for, though the constitution is a compact, he is not a party to it” ~ Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Savannah 14 Ga. 438, 1854 WL 1492 (Ga., Jan Term 1854) (NO. 64)

Source

The case was decided in the Supreme Court of Georgia, not the US Supreme Court, and the ruling, like the Dred Scott ruling never survived the Civil war.

The overruling was recognized in Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (Ga.App. Feb 25, 1964) (NO. 40186, 40187)

The doctrine of co-equality and co-ordination between the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States, so vigorously announced by Benning, J., in Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439, regarded now from a practical standpoint, seems visionary. Its application to this, or any like case, would be a jarring discord in the harmony of law. Moreover, any attempt to apply it effectively would be no less vain than discordant. When we know with certainty that a question arising under the Constitution *361 of the United States has been definitely decided by the Supreme Court of that government, it is our duty to accept the decision, for the time being, as correct, whether it coincides with our opinion or not. Any failure of due subordination on our part would be a breach, rather than the administration, of law.’ It needs scarcely to be added that this court, when a question arises as to the construction of a portion of the Constitution of the United States, or a statute enacted in pursuance thereof, feels it to be its duty to follow, as binding precedents, the adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States. State v. Atlantic & Gulf Railroad Co., 60 Ga. 268;Georgia Railroad v. Cubbedge, 75 Ga. 321; Murray v. Miller, 157 Ga. 11 (121 SE 113); Slicer v. State, 168 Ga. 566 (148 SE 385).” Accordingly, the law as exemplified in the Winston case, supra, and similar cases decided by this court and the Supreme Court of Georgia is no longer the law and we are bound to follow the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Mapp case, supra, as to the admissibility of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure resulting from an illegal arrest. See Scott v. State, 14 Ga. App. 806, supra, and Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12, 15 (25 SE 608, 59 ASR 226).