“Plaintiff should not be charged fees, or costs for the lawful and constitutional right to petition this court in this matter in which he is entitled to relief, as it appears that the filing fee rule was originally implemented for fictions and subjects of the State and should not be applied to the Plaintiff who is a natural individual and entitled to relief” — Hale v. Henkel (201 U.S. 43).
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a natural man or woman is entitled [right] to relief for free access to its judicial tribunals and public offices in every State in the Union — 2 Black 620, see also Crandell (sic) v. Nevada, 6 Wall 35.
As I pointed out, the courts have rejected these claims:
Plaintiff’s objection to the Court’s Order requiring him to provide more detailed financial information is without merit. Plaintiff’s “response” to the Court’s order asserts that the filing fees are “unlawful.” (Dkt. 7.) Attached to Plaintiff’s response are several documents, including a “Mandatory Notice” quoting Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867) and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) for the proposition that filing fees are unconstitutional. Neither case supports Plaintiff’s objection. Crandall considered the propriety of a tax levied upon every person leaving the state of Nevada by railroad or stagecoach, while Hale considered whether an officer of a corporation charged with a criminal violation could refuse to respond to a subpoena deuces tecum directed toward the corporation. Neither case is applicable here.
Filing fees have been consistently upheld on the grounds that reasonable costs may be imposed on persons who want to sue. Lumbert v. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1987). “Litigation is not a free good, and its costs are not limited to those who initiate it.” Id. See also Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the imposition of partial filing fees on IFP plaintiffs).
Plaintiff includes also a “Public Notice” that he is a member of the Posterity of We the People, and a “nonresident” of the state of Idaho or any other state, and therefore subject only to the “universal laws of nature.” Further, Plaintiff includes an “affidavit of truth” that he is not subject to “any entity anywhere,” and additional filings asserting that he is a member of the “Citizens of Idaho” and has filed a UCC Financing Statement in California.
Plaintiff appears to be relying on a “sovereign citizen” theory to challenge the Court’s filing fee, which has been unsuccessfully propounded by others. This legal theory seems to have originated in the context of tax protests, and is generally advanced to challenge state and federal laws and judgments. The theory (in all of its various forms) has been struck down consistently by the courts. See United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that plaintiff’s argument that he was a citizen of the state of Indiana, but not a citizen of the United States and therefore not subject to its laws was “simply wrong”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that defendant’s argument that he was a citizen of the “Republic of Idaho” and not a U.S. citizen and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the United States was “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous”); U.S. v. Delatorre, 2008 WL 312647, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“This Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Delatorre remains valid whether his name is written in all capital letters or a mix of capital and lower case letters, or whether he identifies himself as: a `real flesh and blood man, in his private capacity,’ a `sovereign secured party creditor;’ a debtor; the `authorized representative of the corporate fiction-entity/debtor identified, as Fernando Delatorre,’ or `third party intervenor on behalf of Defendant/Debtor Fernando Delatorre.’ Mr. Delatorre’s Uniform Commercial Code (`UCC’), copyright, and trademark filings do not change this fact.”).