Orly has a new ‘theory’ about how any judge could forward information to any Grand Jury under 18 USC 3332(a).
While she still ignores that 18 USC 3332(a) applies to a Special Grand Jury only, she also has ignored the text and precedents of the statute.
Let’s start with the Statute 18 USC 3332(a) which is part of 18 U.S. Code Chapter 216 – SPECIAL GRAND JURY:
(a) It shall be the duty of each such grand jury impaneled within any judicial district to inquire into offenses against the criminal laws of the United States alleged to have been committed within that district. Such alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the grand jury by the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf of the United States for the presentation of evidence. Any such attorney receiving information concerning such an alleged offense from any other person shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of such alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s action or recommendation.
Note that it says “the court” and not “a court”. I understand that the lack of definite articles in some Slavic languages may confuse our dentist friend, however such distinctions are important when addressing legal ‘arguments’.
In In Re Grand Jury Application, 617 F. Supp. 199 – Dist. Court, SD New York 1985, the Judge observed that
Plaintiffs have urged me to request the grand jury to hear their evidence against the defendants. Although a judge may present evidence to a grand jury both under common law, see O’Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir.1965), and pursuant to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a), I decline to do so. The legislative history of Section 3332(a) suggests that Congress envisioned the United States Attorney’s office as the primary channel of information to the grand jury. In a busy district such as this, moreover, it is the United States Attorney and not the individual district judge who is familiar with, and in fact sets, the schedules of the grand juries which have been impanelled in the district. Any effort by myself to bring plaintiffs’ information to the attention of a grand jury would necessarily be channeled through the United States Attorney.
In O’BRYAN v. Chandler, 352 F. 2d 987 – Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit 1965, the Judge found that
The grand jury was regularly convened in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, of which Judge Chandler was the Chief Judge. Acting in that capacity, he had 990*990 qualified the grand jury, designated its foreman and deputy foreman, and submitted to it the usual instructions. It was an appendage to the court over which he presided. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 79 S.Ct. 539, 3 L.Ed.2d 609, rehearing denied 359 U.S. 976, 79 S.Ct. 873, 3 L.Ed.2d 843. The O’Bryan claim had been heard by Judge Chandler in a proceeding pending in his court; that he strongly suspected irregularity in the filing of that claim is understandable. The propriety of his expressions of opinion as to O’Bryan’s guilt is questionable; still, the Judge had the power and jurisdiction not only to call attention to what he thought was a violation of the law, but also to direct that available evidence be presented to the grand jury. Arbor v. Blue, 10 Cir., 45 F.2d 746.
Note that the power and jurisdiction lies in the hands of the Judge who convened the Grand Jury.
Similarly in Simpson v. Reno, 902 F. Supp. 254 – Dist. Court, Dist. of Columbia 1995, the court found that:
An individual may appear before a grand jury only at the invitation of the grand jury, the prosecutor, or the court of the appropriate jurisdiction, in its supervisory capacity. In re Application of Larry A. Wood, 833 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.1987). The court’s supervisory power over a grand jury is limited by the doctrine of separation of powers. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977). “[G]iven the constitutionally-based independence of each of the three actors — court, prosecutor and grand jury — a court may not exercise its supervisory power in a way which encroaches on the prerogatives of the other two unless there is a clear basis in law and fact for doing so.” Id.