Vogt, or rather his ghost writer Montgomery Blair Sibley (author of the PDF) has now petitioned the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal for a writ of mandamus. He insists that the court issues three writs of mandamus:
[Dr Conspiracy has a fascinating post as well]
(i) correct the docket in the District Court to accurately reflect the proceedings below, (ii) acknowledge Vogt’s discharge of his obligations under the Misprision statutes, and (iii) in so much as the “public interest so requires”, summon a grand jury to hear Vogt’s forensic evidence which demonstrates that the Certificates of Live Birth (“COLBs”) proffered by Barack Hussein Obama, II (“Obama”) to prove his eligibility to be President are indisputably forgeries.
Let me predict why they will fail again.
The write of mandamus is an extraordinary measure and should be used sparingly
A review of Supreme Court and recent Ninth Circuit cases pertaining to the appellate use of peremptory writs discloses some general admonitory language and five guiding principles. The admonitory language has been partially collected in the Supreme Court’s most recent case on the subject, Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976), aff’g, 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1975):
The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be involved only in extraordinary situations. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 [88 S.Ct. 269, 273, 19 L.Ed.2d 305] (1967); Banker’s Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-385 [74 S.Ct. 145, 147-149, 98 L.Ed. 106] (1953); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259, [67 S.Ct. 1558, 1559, 91 L.Ed. 2041] (1947). As we have observed, the writ “has traditionally been used in the federal courts only `to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.'” Will v. United States, 389 U.S., at 95, [88 S.Ct. , at 273] quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 [63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185] (1943). And, while we have not limited the use of mandamus by an unduly narrow and technical understanding of what constitutes a matter of “jurisdiction,” Will v. United States, 389 U.S., at 95, [88 S.Ct. , at 273] the fact still remains that “only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial `usurpation of power’ will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” Ibid.
The 5 rules are
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires
(2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal.
(3) The district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
(4) The district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules.
(5) The district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.
None of these appear to apply in any meaningful manner.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a mandamus petitioner must “satisfy `the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.
Vogt’s problem is that the case is appealable but only if Vogt accepts that there is an actual legal case. Since he is trying to get the court to instruct the lower court that there is not legal case, he appears to shoot himself in the foot. Worse, if Vogt insists that there is some procedure the court should or should not pursue, it needs to show that there is indeed such a duty.
Lack of Duty
There is NO duty of the Judge to discharge Vogt of his obligations under the misprision statute. In fact, there are a variety of problems here. First of all, Vogt continues to ignore that the Misprision statutes include the term ‘conceal’ which is an essential requirement for misprision, second of all, one cannot invoke a civil procedure to enforce a criminal statute and finally, absent any legal procedure, there is not even a rule that requires the judges to discharge Vogt of his obligations.
While Vogt tries to claim that a duty exists, there is just none. Which is probably why the word duty is enclosed in scare-quotes/
Upon assignment to Judge Robart, he had a “duty” to acknowledge that he had received that which Vogt had filed. Simply stated, Vogt deserves a formal acknowledgment from the District Court of the duty that Congress has imposed upon it pursuant to the Misprision statues.
So it there a duty that the judge summons a grand jury and to allow the grand jury to hear Vogt’s ‘forensic’ evidence?
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures merely state that a Judge has to summon a grand jury when public interests so require. But this does not mean that the judge has to forward any specific information to the Grand Jury. Vogt has no foundation to have a judge summon a grand jury, let alone to force said judge to allow certain evidence the be presented.
So what about 18 USC 3332?
In Sibley v Obama the court rejected such arguments:
Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3332, Sibley also seeks mandamus to require Machen to inform the grand jury of plaintiffs identity and President Obama’s alleged wire fraud, as well as to reveal what action or recommendation was taken regarding this entreaty. The Court will deny the mandamus request, in keeping with prior decisions that 18 U.S.C. § 3332 cannot be enforced by private individuals. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wainstein, 2006 U.S. App. LEXlS 16026, at *2 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 2006). Per § 3332, an individual may request that the U.S. Attorney present evidence of alleged offenses to the grand jury; but that does not directly benefit plaintiff, so it does not create Article III standing to enforce particular action by the U.S. Attorney. Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Very few cases have considered the application of this statute, the cases are not appellate decisions, and those cases are split. Compare In re Grand Jury Application, 617 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (plaintiffs are entitled to writ of mandamus to compel U.S. Attorney to present facts concerning alleged criminal wrongdoing to grand jury), with Simpson v. Reno, 902 F.Supp. 254 (D.D.C.1995) (plaintiffs have no clear and indisputable right to compel U.S. Attorney to allow them to appear and give testimony before grand jury), aff’d, No. 95-5368, 1996 WL 556625 (D.C.Cir. Sept. 25, 1996). Moreover, any right provided in this statute must be weighed against prosecutorial discretion and the limits on judicial review of prosecutorial decision
Plaintiff also seeks the impanelment of a special grand jury. I note, in that regard, that impanelment of special grand juries is a function reserved to the court, which has the discretionary authority to convene or discharge a grand jury. Petition of A&H Transp., Inc., 319 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 1963). While plaintiff’s motion does specify a legal basis for the relief sought, it could be construed as implicating the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which in essence requires the United States Attorney to present information regarding criminal activity to a special grand jury, upon request, and seeking mandamus relief requiring the United States Attorney to take such measures in connection with her allegations. See Simpson v. Reno, 902 F. Supp. 254, 257 (D.D.C. 1995); In re Grand Jury Application, 617 F. Supp. at 201-06.
There is no special grand jury currently sitting in the Northern District of New York and, because the decision to empanel one is entirely discretionary, the relief which plaintiff seeks relief cannot be awarded by the court by order in the nature of mandamus.Simpson, 902 F.Supp. at 256-57.
Once again, plaintiff Ronald Patterson has filed a motion seeking some form of federal grand jury investigation related to a litany of constitutional violations allegedly perpetrated against him by a wide array of individuals and organizations, including the undersigned. In this Motion, Patterson asks for a Writ of Mandamus (Doc. No. 85) to compel the United States Attorney to convene and present information to such a grand jury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3332. This motion is denied.
… Thus, even if Patterson had standing to bring suit to compel presentation of evidence in an ongoing special grand jury investigation to the grand jury, there is no grand jury to present it to. Moreover, courts have generally found that no such standing exists. See Banks v. Buchanan, 336 Fed.Appx. 122, 123 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Banks is correct that § 3332 requires the U.S. Attorney to inform the grand jury of information provided by `any person’ about an `offense [ ] against the criminal laws of the United States.’ If does not, however, confer standing upon Banks to enforce the U.S. Attorney’s obligation, as Banks’s interest in the prosecution of AUSA Conway is not a legally protected interest.”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3332); Seargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Insofar as Mohwish has a legally cognizable interest in collaterally attacking his conviction by convincing a grand jury to indict the federal officers who, he alleges, wrongfully prosecuted him, the vindication of that interest is too speculative (not to say fanciful) to support his standing.”); but see In re Grand Jury Application, 617 F.Supp. 119, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding the plaintiff had standing, in an organized crime case, to seek enforcement of the statute and have the United States Attorney present evidence to a grand jury but determining as “critical” the fact that “plaintiffs do not seek to compel the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the named defendants.”).
At least one court accepts that there exists a plausibility to his request but observes that standing is an obstacle.
Mohwish’s request that his evidence be presented to the grand jury is, unlike his other requests, at least plausible. Section 3332 says on its face that the U.S. Attorney “shall” present to the grand jury information provided by “any person,” and one district court has held that any person has standing to enforce this duty. See In re Grand Jury Application, 617 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (granting mandamus to enforce § 3332); see also Simpson, 902 F.Supp. at 254 (dictum). In our view, however, Mohwish does not have standing to enforce the statute.Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F. 3d 1067 – Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 1997