Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and this Court’s Rules, Plaintiffs/Appellants move this Court to amend Appellants’ motion to stay the District Court’s order sanctioning attorney Van Irion. Grounds for this motion are that the Appellants original motion contained one assertion of fact in error.Specifically, Appellants move that this Court to disregard subsection III F of Appellants’ motion.
And, yet again, Venn Aryan demonstrates an appalling lack of candor with the court.
Van is pissed that he didn’t get a hearing, and in support of this he cites to a 9th Circuit case from 1987:It should be noted that the District Court did deny Plaintiffs/Appellants’ request for a hearing prior to imposing sanctions. Notice and hearing should precede imposition of sanction for attorney’s alleged unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings. T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987)(emphasis added). In the instant case a hearingwas requested and was not granted.
Apparently, we’re expected to believe that Venn Aryan’s research skills are good enough to let him dig up a quarter-century old case from another circuit, yet so bad that he managed to miss this one:Moreover, although the incident happened outside the presence of the court, that fact alone does not require an evidentiary hearing. It is within the discretion of the district court to determine whether an evidentiary hearing would assist the court in its decision. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to conduct an evidentiary hearing.In determining that Mr. Jaques was responsible for the assault that caused the mistrial, the lower court considered the Incident Report, witnesses’ statements, and Mr. Jaques’ response to the court’s show cause order, an eleven-page detailed response outlining why he should not be sanctioned for his actions. The court, in its June 13th Order, noted that it carefully considered Mr. Jaques’ response to the show cause order. (J.A. at 150.) Therefore, a hearing would have only provided Mr. Jaques with another opportunity to rehash what he already contended in his response to the show cause order. The lower court had all it needed to make a determination of fault; it had all of the witnesses’ statements as well as Mr. Jaques’ rendition of the incident. Moreover, Judge Friedman was very familiar with the conduct of the attorneys, having presided over the underlying proceeding since 1993; who could better assess the conduct of the attorneys than someone who was not only familiar with the attorneys but with the witnesses as well.5 We find nothing in the *776 record to indicate that a hearing was needed to assist the court in its decision that Mr. Jaques acted without justification in laying his hands on Mr. Emery. Therefore, it was proper for the lower court to assess sanctions upon Mr. Jaques pursuant to § 1927 without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Cook v. Am. S.S. Co., 134 F.3d 771, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1998)