Native and Natural Born Citizenship Explored (Re-opened for limited business)

The JagHunter ‘orders’ Obama’s arrest

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Sat, 26 Dec 2009 22:11:31 +0000

In a hilarious move, the JagHunter, having failed to convince a Grand Jury of the case against Obama, is now ‘ordering’ Special Agent Richard L. Lambert, Jr.of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Knoxville to arrest Obama. Why? Because in a misreading of facts, the JagHunter believes that

Obama forcibly subjugates United States Citizens to secret police power the United States Constitution prohibits. International criminal “police officers,” freely operate on American soil obedient to international law unknown to the United States Constitution.

What is Obama’s crime? In an executive order he revoked parts of the restrictions placed on Interpol by Reagan. Somehow this has been ‘translated’ by some into allowing Interpol full reign on US soil. Don’t these people know how Interpol functions? Why is it that ignorance is guiding these people? Asking for the arrest of the President for doing his job and following the law.

For Immediate Release

December 17, 2009

Executive Order — Amending Executive Order 12425

EXECUTIVE ORDER

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER 12425 DESIGNATING INTERPOL
AS A PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ENTITLED TO
ENJOY CERTAIN PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288), and in order to extend the appropriate privileges, exemptions, and immunities to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), it is hereby ordered that Executive Order 12425 of June 16, 1983, as amended, is further amended by deleting from the first sentence the words “except those provided by Section 2(c), Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6 of that Act” and the semicolon that immediately precedes them.

Reagan’s executive order stated

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669, 22 U.S.C. 288), it is hereby ordered that the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), in which the United States participates pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 263a, is hereby designated as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions and immunities conferred by the International Organizations Immunities Act; except those provided by Section 2(c), the portions of Section 2(d) and Section 3 relating to customs duties and federal internal-revenue importation taxes, Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6 of that Act. This designation is not intended to abridge in any respect the privileges, exemptions or immunities which such organization may have acquired or may acquire by international agreement or by Congressional action.

RONALD REAGAN
The White House,
June 16,1983.

Obama merely extended full privileges to Interpol, the same privileges which have been extended to cover many other international organizations.

Orly versus West

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Sat, 26 Dec 2009 21:52:16 +0000

Orly versus the facts argued

ng:

During the October 5 motion hearing pursuant to the motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction, the moving parties, the assistant US attorneys David DeJutte and Roger West have argued that they believe that the proper jurisdiction for this case is the District of Columbia.

The facts

From the Oct 5 hearing page 8 lines 13-23:

“THE COURT: And then in your argument you stated that minimally if the Court disagreed, it should be transferred to the D.C. District.

MR. WEST: No, Your Honor. The quo warranto — the plaintiffs have made the argument that the quo warranto aspects of this case should be transferred to the D.C. District. We have not suggested that that be transferred. If the — if, in fact, they wish to bring a quo warranto action, they should bring an original one in the D.C. District.

THE COURT: Thank you.”

Page 18 lines 7-14:

“MR. WEST: I don’t believe that quo warranto is applicable to the President of the United States. I would not concede that. However, if it were, the only statute that we know of that would cover this kind of a situation would be the D.C. statute. But I think that we’re not conceding at all that quo warranto would apply to the President of the United States.”

Merry Christmas Orly

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Sat, 26 Dec 2009 00:12:45 +0000

Orly seems to encourage people to ‘bare arms’… But is she really suggesting an armed insurrection? How ‘patriotic’ of her…

there is a lot of corruption in the judiciary, just as it is in the government and Congress. Until people will take to the streets and demonstrate preserving their 2nd amendment rights to bare arms and organise in militias, the judges will keep deciding for the usurper

Dr Conspiracy

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Fri, 25 Dec 2009 06:48:47 +0000

Many good references but this one caught my eyes

Musata v. U.S. Department of Justice United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (1999)

Petitioners Marian and Lenuta Mustata are citizens of Romania. At the time of their petition, they resided in Michigan with their two minor children, who are natural born citizens of the United States.

Senate Healthcare passes 60-39…

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Fri, 25 Dec 2009 01:12:56 +0000

Merry Christmas and God Bless.

Keyes/Barnett v Obama – What can I say..

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Thu, 24 Dec 2009 21:20:02 +0000

Undeterred by legal rules, Orly has now filed a motion for a hearing to transfer the case to the District of Columbia. Does she really not understand what it means when the motion to dismiss with prejudice was granted by Judge Carter? Note how the original case was never a Quo Warranto case, although Orly attempted to turn it into one. Once the case was dismissed she attempts to reopen the case and have it transferred to a different Court. I am curious if Carter will finally decide to sanction her for her conduct. Orly also has admitted that all the defendants are employed by the federal government, thus accepting President Obama’s position, making impeachment the only solution. I can understand why Orly is so desperate to keep the case open since she may not have any more plaintiffs to file a suit, and since she believes that the suit was filed properly before President Obama’s Constitutional term in office began. Remember however that a case MUST be dismissed when the Court lacks Jurisdiction.

Furthermore the rule she cites states

Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of the United States where all other parties request transfer.

It is important to note that this applies to lack of personal jurisdiction, not lack of subject matter jurisdiction issues. The case was not solely dismissed on lack of personal jurisdiction but rather because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction which renders the case moot and void. A court will not consider a motion to transfer if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See for instance

Atlantic Ship Rigging Co v. D McLellan E 288 F.2d 589, 288 F.2d 589, 1961

Recently, this court in Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 3 Cir., 1961, 286 F.2d 527, held that a court is without power to transfer an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) absent jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.2 Where, as here, the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is a more fundamental defect than an absence of in personam jurisdiction, and one which precludes it from acting at all, a fortiori a court lacks power to transfer.

or First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines 190 F.2d 493 (1951) Cert Denied (1951)

Finally we pause to consider plaintiff’s contention that the court erred in not sustaining its motion to transfer the case to the District Court in Utah pursuant to § 1406(a) of the judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). This section applies only when a case has been filed in the wrong venue. Orr v. United States, 2 Cir., 174 F.2d 577, 580. Compare Riley v. Union Pac. R. Co., 7 Cir., 177 F.2d 673, and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 Cir., 183 F. 2d 640, 646. Unfortunately here the District Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, hence it had no power to transfer the case to another court.

Or Yarto v Washington Export Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-0054-L Texas Northern District 2007

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim. See Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, they lack the power to adjudicate claims and must dismiss an action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Id.; Stockman v. Federal Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994)). Otherwise stated, were the court to lack subject matter jurisdiction over this case, dismissal would be appropriate, and the court would be without power to order a transfer of venue to the Eastern District of Washington. Accordingly, prior to considering whether venue transfer is warranted, it is incumbent upon the court to address the challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction.

Carter clearly ruled that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendants assert that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this action on five bases: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate Article III standing; (2) the issues in this action present non-justiciable political questions; (3) this Court is not the appropriate forum for Plaintiffs’ quo warranto claims; (4) this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; and (5) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim with respect to their Freedom of Information Act claims and all claims against Defendants Clinton, Gates, Michelle
Obama, and Biden

Orly herself admitted that there is no reason to transfer the case

The Complaint recognizes that the District of Columbia would be the appropriate district in which to bring this writ, but alleges that bringing
this request to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia would be futile because the United States Attorney is biased and Judge Robertson within that district had already rejected a similar case in which President Obama’s qualifications were challenged.

It seems that Orly failed 1406(b)

Section 1406(b), 28 U.S.C. (1964 ed.), provides that:

“Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the venue.”

12/24/2009 105 NOTICE OF MOTION AND First MOTION to Transfer Case to District of Columbia filed by plaintiff Clint Grimes, Julliett Ireland, D Andrew Johnson, Israel D Jones, Timothy Jones, David Fullmer LaRoque, Gail Lightfoot, Lita M Lott, David Grant Mosby, Steven Kay Neuenschwander, Frank Niceley, Jerry ONeil, Robert Lee Perry, Harry Riley, Jeffrey Wayne Rosner, David Smithey, John Bruce Steidel, Douglas Earl Stoeppelwerth, Eric Swafford, Neil B Turner, Richard E Venable, Jeff Graham Winthrope, Mark Wriggle, Alan Keyes PhD, Pamela Barnett, Richard Norton Bauerbach, Robin D Biron, John D Blair, David L Bosley, Loretta G Bosley, Harry G Butler, Glenn Casada, Jennifer Leah Clark, Timothy Comerford, Charles Crusemire, Cynthia Davis, Thomas S Davidson, Matthew Michael Edwards, Jason Freese, Kurt C Fuqua. Motion set for hearing on 1/25/2010 at 10:00 AM before Judge David O. Carter. (Taitz, Orly) (Entered: 12/24/2009)

NOTICE OF MOTION HEARING AND MOTION TO TRANSFER TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

All the parties in the above captioned case are hereby notified of the motion hearing to be held on January 25, 2010, at the Central District Court of California, Santa Ana Division, Judge Honorable David O. Carter, 411 W 4^th str. Courtroom 9D, Santa Ana, California, Ronald Reagan Federal Building. Motion to be heard is the Motion to transfer the above captioned case to Honorable judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the US district court for the District of Columbia

MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF THE CASE TO THE HONORABLE ROYCE LAMBERTH CHIEF JUDGE OF THE US DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Pursuant to local rule 7-4 prior to making the motion below the undersigned attorney contacted the US attorneys’ office for the Meet and Confer conference and got a response from the assistant US attorney David DeJutte via e-mail on 12.23.09.

Note: Orly does not present the response… I wonder why :-)

Here come the plaintiffs in this case aside from Willey Drake and Markham Robinson represented by Mr. Kreep and state the following:

During the October 5 motion hearing pursuant to the motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction, the moving parties, the assistant US attorneys David DeJutte and Roger West have argued that they believe that the proper jurisdiction for this case is the District of Columbia.
On October 29 this case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction only and was never heard on the merits, as this court noted in the above order that the proper jurisdiction is the District of Columbia court.
28 US Chapter 87 §1391 (b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
4. 28 US Code Chapter 87 § 1404 (a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.
In the interest of judicial economy, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of expedient resolution of this case of National importance for “we the people of the United States of America”, in the interest of the National Security and in the interest of Justice, the undersigned counsel respectfully moves the court to transfer this case to Honorable Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the US District Court for the District of Columbia, for the case to be heard on the merits as soon as possible.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

28 US Code Chapter 87 § 1404 (a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.

Precedents of Biochem Pharma Inc v. Emory University 148F. Supp 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C 2001); Osan Ltd. V. Accenture LLP 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27488; Fleming v Ford Motor Co., 2005 U. S. Dist. Ct. 497559 2006 U,.S. Ct Pleading Lexis 24093 have held that a case can be transferred to another district for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, and the transfer analysis requires the district court to weigh the private and public factors involved in the case.

The defendants in this case have already argued for the transfer during the October 5, 2009 hearing, stating that the proper venue is the District of Columbia therefore they cannot argue against this motion. The October 29 order stated that this was the opinion of the court. The undersigned counsel has filed a motion for clarification seeking to find out whether the October 29 order was an order with the leave to amend. As the latest order clarified that this court is not willing to provide for leave to amend in the Central District of California, the only reasonable solution and conclusion would be the transfer of the case to the US District Court of Columbia, for which the defendants have argued previously and to which the plaintiffs now agree as the only viable alternative. All the defendants are residents of the District of Columbia and officials in the federal government in the DC area, which satisfied both the private and public prongs of the test. Appealing the October 29 order to the circuit court of appeals will delay the hearing of the case for a year to a year and a half. Considering the position and influence of the defendants, it might be even a longer process. Transfer of the case to the District of Columbia will resolve any challenges to the jurisdiction on part of the defendants, and would give the plaintiffs an opportunity to start the discovery immediately. This will bring about an immediate resolution of this case, which of course will serve the interest of the parties and public interest. As such the under signed counsel moves this honorable court to transfer the case to the US District Court of Columbia.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the undersigned counsel respectfully moves this Honorable court to transfer this case to Honorable Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge for the US District Court for the District of Columbia, for the case to be heard on the merits in the District of Columbia as soon as possible.

Facts are stubborn things: Obama is a natural-born citizen

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Thu, 24 Dec 2009 04:48:34 +0000

Jamie Freeze at Renew America has an article where she outlines why the President is a natural born citizen.

Facts are stubborn things. They refuse to go away just because people disagree with them or wish they’d go away. The Birther Movement is a stubborn thing too. It refuses to go away even when proven wrong. It is appalling that the myth of Obama’s non-citizenship is allowed to flourish given that a simple search in LexisNexis of “natural born citizen” pulled up all of the relevant case law and statutes. You don’t even have to be a lawyer to understand it! However, I learned a long time ago that most people are sheep — they’d rather regurgitate something they’ve heard rather than doing their own research. And the old adage is true: if you say something often enough, people will believe it. For once let’s say the truth often enough and hope people believe it. Let’s forget about conspiracy theories and focus on the real issue: Obama’s policies. After all, I don’t deal well with incompetent people.

In a followup the following somewhat sarcastic but still valid observation is made

It is sad that Alan Keyes didn’t have the brilliant Jamie Freeze to advise him so he wouldn’t have displayed his apparent ignorance of the law when he brought Berg v. Obama et al., Martin v. Lingle, Donofrio v. Wells, Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, Keyes v. Bowen, Hollister v. Soetoro, Cook v. Obama, Barnett v. Obama, and Ankeny v. Gov. State of Indiana, all for the purpose of producing an original U.S. birth certificate and all surely taking thousands of hours of legal research. I am sure if he has read Ms Freeze’s article, he must be in anguish that he hadn’t merely solicited her brilliant baccalaureat legal expertise in the first place.
Orly Taitz has been contacted with the news, so that she can rush out and withdraw her pending lawsuits.

Hint: Orly has no pending lawsuits… and yes, Keyes could have done better by familiarizing himself first with the facts. Now he is faced with 61 overall losses and 0 wins.

Attorney General Bates on Citizenship 1862

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Wed, 23 Dec 2009 22:56:28 +0000

Extracts of an opinion of Mr. Attorney-General Bates, dated December 29, 1862.

Who is a citizen ! What constitutes a citizen of the United States? I have often been pained by the fruitless search in our law books and the records of our courts for a clear and satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the United States. I find no such definition, no authoritative establishment of the meaning of the phrase, neither by a course of judicial decision in our courts, nor by the continued and consentaneous action of the different branches of our political government. For anght I see to the contrary, the subject is now as little understood in its details and elements, and the question as open to argument and to speculative criticism, as it was at the beginning of the Government. Eighty years of practical enjoyment of citizenship, under the Constitution, have not sufficed to teach us either the exact meaning of the word, or the constituent elements of the thing we prize so highly.

In most instances, within my knowledge, in which the matter of citizenship has been discussed, the argument has not turned upon the existence and the intrinsic qualities of citizenship itself, but upon the claim of some right or privilege as belonging to and inhering in the character of a citizen. In this way we are easily led into errors both in fact and principle. We see individuals, who are known to. be citizens, in the actual enjoyment of certain rights and privileges, and in the actual exercise of certain powers, social and political, and we, inconsiderately, and without any regard to legal and logical consequences, attribute to those individuals, and to all of their class, the enjoyment of those rights and privileges, and the exercise of those powers, as incidents to their citizenship, and belonging to them only in their quality of citizens.

In such cases it often happens that the rights enjoyed and the powers exercised liave no relation whatever to the quality of citizen, and might be as perfectly enjoyed and exercised by known aliens. For instance, General Bernard, a distinguished soldier and devoted citizen of France, for a long time filled the office of general of engineers in the service of the United States, all the time avowing his French allegiance, and, in fact, closing his relations with the United States by resigning his commission and returning to the service of his own native country. This and all such instances (and they are many) go to prove that in this country the legal capacity to hold office is not confined to citizens, and therefore that the fact of holding any office for which citizenship is not specially prescribed by law as a qualification is no proof that the incumbent is an American citizen.

Again, with regard to the right of suffrage, that is, the right to choose officers of government, there is a very common error, to the effect that the right to vote for public officers is one of the constituent elements of American citizenship, the leading faculty indeed of the, citizen, the test at once of this legal right and the sufficient proof of his membership of the body-politic. No error can be greater than this, and few more injurious to the right understanding of our constitutions, and the actual working of our political government. It is not only not true in law or in fact, in principle or in practice, but the reverso is conspicuously true ; for I make bold to affirm that, viewing the nation ae a whole, or viewing the States separately, there is no district in the nation in which a majority of the known and recognized citizens are not excluded by law from the right of suffrage. Besides those who are excluded specially on account of some personal defect, such as paupers, idiots, lunatics, and men convicted of infamous crimes, and, in some States, soldiers, all females, and all minor males are also excluded. And these, in every community, make the mnjority ; and yet, I think, no one -will venture to deny that women and children, and lunatics, and even convict felons, may be citizens of the United States.

Our code (unlike the codes of France, and perhaps some other nations) makes no provision for loss or legal deprivation of citizenship. Once a citizen, whether natus or datus (as Sir Edward Coke, expresses it,) always a citizen, unless changed by the volition and act of the individual. Neither infancy nor madness nor crime can take away from the subject the quality of citizen. And our laws do, in express terms, declare women and children to he citizens. See, for one instance, the act of Congress of February 10,1855,10 Stat., 604.

The Constitution of the United States does not declare who are and who are not citizens, nor does it, attempt to describe the constituent elements of citizenship. It leaves that quality where it found it, resting upon the fact of home, birth, and upon the laws of the several States. Even in the important matter of electing members of Congress it does no more than provide that ” the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in the several States shall have the qualifications requisite for the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.” Here the word citizen is not mentioned, and it is a legal fact, known of course to all lawyers and publicists, that the constitutions of several of the States, in specifying the qualifications of electors, do altogether omit and exclude the words citizen and citizenship. will refer, in proof, to but three instances.

1. The constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1779-’80, in article 4 of section 3,cap. 1, provides as follows : ” Every male реrson, being twenty-one years of age, and resident of a particular town in this Commonwealth for the space of one year next preceding, having a freehold estate within the same town of the annual income of three pounds, or any estate of the value of sixty pounds, shall have the right to vote in the choice of representative or representatives for said town.”

2. The constitution of North Carolina, adopted in 1776, after a bill of rights, and after reciting that “whereas allegiance and protection are, in their nature, reciprocal, and the one should of right be refused where the other is withdrawn,” declares, in section 8, that freemen at the age of twenty-one years, who have been inhabitants of any one county within the State twelve months immediately preceding the day of any election, and shall have paid public taxes, shall be entitled to vote for members of the house of commons for the county in which he resides.”

3. The constitution of Illinois, adopted in 1818, in article 2, section 27, declares that “in all elections all white male inhabitant» above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State six months next preceding the election, shall enjoy the right of an elector ; but no person shall be entitled to vote except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at the time of the election.”

These three constitutions belong to States widely separated in geographical position, varying greatly from each other in habits, manners, and pursuits, having different climates, soils, productions, and domestic institutions, and yet not one of the three have made citizenship a necessary qualification for a voter; all three of them exclude all females, but only one of them (Illinois) has excluded the black man from the right of suffrage. And it is historically true that the practice has conformed to the theory of those constitutions respectively; for, without regard to citizenship, the colored man has not voted in Illinois, and freemen of all colors have votedin North Carolina and Massachussetts.

From all this it is manifest that American citizenship does not necessarily depend upon nor co-exist with the legal capacity to hold office, and the right of suffrage, either or both of them. The Constitution of the United States, as I have said, does not define citizenship ; neither does it declare who may vote, nor who may hold office, except in regard to a few of the highest national functionaries. And the several States, as far as I know, in exercising that power act independently, and without any controlling authority over them, and hence it follows that there is no limit to their power in that particular but their own prudence and discretion ; and therefore wo are not surprised te find these faculties of voting and holding office are not uniform in the different States, but are made to depend upon a variety of facts, purely discretionary, such as ago, sex, race, color, property, resilience in a particular place, and length of residence there.

On this point, then, I conclude that no person in the United States did ever exercise the right of suffrage in virtue of the naked, unassisted fact of citizenship. In every instance the right depends upon some additional fact and cumulative qualification, which may as perfectly exist without as with citizenship.

I am aware that some of our most learned lawyers and able writers have allowed themselves to speak upon this subject in loose and indeterminate language. They speak “of all the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Constitntion to the citizen,” without telling us what they are. They speak of a man’s citizenship as defective and imperfect, because he is supposed not to have “all the civil rights,” (all the jura civitatis, as expressed by one of my predecessors,) without telling what particular rights they are, nor what relation they have, if any, with citizenship. And they suggest, without affirming, that there may be different grades of citizenship, of higher and lower degree in point of legal virtue and efficacy ; one grade ” in the sense of the Constitution,” and another inferior grade made hy a State, and not recognized by the Constitution.

In my opinion the Constitution uses the word “citizen” only to express the political quality of the individual in his relations to the nation ; to declare that he is a member ef the body-politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the one side, and protection on the other. And I have no knowledge of any other kind of political citizenship, higer or lower, statal or national ; or of any other sense in which the word has been used in the Constitution, or can be used properly in the laws of the United States. The phrase “a citizen of the United States, without addition or qualification, means neither more nor less than a member of the nation. And all such are, politically and legally, equal. The child in the cradle and its father in the Senate are equally citizens of the United States. And it needs no argument to prove that every citizen of a State is, necessarily, a citizen of the United States; and to me it is equally clear that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the particular State in which he is domiciled.

And as to voting and holding office, as that privilege is not essential to citizenship, so the deprivation of it by law is not a deprivation of citizenship. No more so in the case of a negro than in case of a white woman or child.

In common speech the word ” citizen,” with more or less of truth and pertinency, has a variety of meanings. Sometimes it is used in contrast with soldier ; sometimes with farmer or countryman; sometimes with alien or foreigner. Speaking of a particular man, we ask, Is he a citizen or a soldier ! meaning, Is he engaged in civil or military pursuits ! Is he a citizen or a countryman ! meaning, Does he live in the city or in the country ! Is he a citizen or an alien ! meaning, Is he a member of our body politic or some other nation ! The first two predicates relate only to the pursuits and to the place of abode of the person. The last is always and wholly political, and concerns only the political and governmental relations of the individual. And it is only in this laet sense, the political, that the word is ever used in the Constitution and statutes of the United States.

We have natural-born citizens, (Constitution, article 2, par. 5,) not made by law or otherwise, but born. And this class is the large majority—in fact, the mass of our citizens—for all others are exceptions specially provided for by law. As they become citizens in the natural way, by birth, so they remain citizens during their natural lives, unless, by their own voluntary act, they expatriate themselves and become citizens or subjects of another nation. For wo have no law (as the French have) to decitenize a citizen who has become such either by the natural process of birth or by the legal process of adoption. And in this connection the Constitution says not one word, and furnishes not one hint, in relation to the color or to the ancestral race of the “natural-born citizen.” Whatever may have been said in the opinions of judges and lawyers, and in State statutes, about negroes, mulattoes, and persons of color, the Constitution is wholly silent upon that subject. The Constitution itself does not make the citizens; (it is, in fact, made by them.) It only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural—home -born —and provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien—foreign-born— making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former.

And I am not aware, of any provision in our laws to warrant us in presuming the existence in this country of a class of persons intermediate between citizens and aliens. In England there is such a class, clearly defined by Law, and called denizens. “A denizen,” says Sir William Blackstone, “is an alien born, but who has obtained, ex donatione regis, letters-patent to make him an English subject; a high and incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative. A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them.”—(Sharwood’s Com., 374.) In this country I know of but one legal authority tending to show the existence of such a class among us. One of my learned predecessors, Mr. Legaré, (4 Opin., 147.) supposes that there may be such a class, and that free colored persons may be ranked in it. Yet, in that same opinion, he declares that a “free man of color, a native of this country, may be admitted to the privileges of a pre-emptioner under the 10th section of the act of the 4th September, 1841.” And that act declares that a pre-emptioner must be either a citizen of tho United States or a person who had declared his intention to become a citizen, as required by the naturalization laws. Of course the ” colored man ” must have been a citizen, or he could not have entered the land under that act of Congress. If not a citizen then by virtue of his native birth, he never could become one by force of law, for our laws extend tho privileges of naturalization to such persons only as are “aliens, being free white persons, and he was neither ; not alien, because natural-born in the country; and not a free white person, because, though free, confessedly “a man of color.”

As far as I know, Mr. Secretary, you and I have no better title to the citizenship which we enjoy than the “accident of birth”—the fact that we happened to be bom in the United States. And our Constitution, in speaking of natural-born citizens, uses no affirmative language to make them such, but only recognizes and reaffirms the universal principle, common to all nations and as old as political society, that the people born, in a country do constitute the nation, and, as individuals, are natural members of the body-politic.

If this be a true principle—and I do not doubt it—it follows that every person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a citizen ; and he who would deny it mußt take upon himself the burden of proving some great disfrauchisement strong enough to override the ” natural-born ” right as recognized by the Constitution in terms the most simple and comprehensive, and without any reference to race or color, or any other accidental circumstance.

That nativity furnishes the rule, both of duty and of right, as between the individual and the government, is a historical and political truth so old and so universally accepted that it is needless to prove it by authority. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of those who may have doubts upon the subject, I note a few books, which, I think, cannot fail to remove all such doubts : Kent’s Com., vol. 2, part 4, sec. 25 ; IÍ1. Com., book 1, ch. 10. p. 365 ; 7 Co. Rep., Calvin’s case ; 4 Term Rep., p. 300, Doe t’. Jones ; 3 Pet. Rep., p. 246, Shanks e. Dupont ; and see a very learned treatise, attributed to Mr. Binney, in 2 Am. Law Reporter, 193.

In every civilized country the individual is born to duties and rights—the duty of allegiance and the right to protection ; and these are correlative obligations, the one the price of the other, and they constitute the all-sufficient bond of union between the individual and his country, and the country he is born in is, prima facie, his country. In most countries the old law was broadly laid down that this natural connection between the individual and his native country was perpetual—at least that the tie was indissoluble by the act of the subject alone. (See Bl. Com. Supra ; 3 Pet. Rep.)

But that law of the perpetuity of allegiance is now changed, both in Europe and America—in some countries by silent acquiescence ; in others by affirmative legislation. In England, while asserting tile perpetuity of natural allegiance, the King, for centuries past, has exercised the power to grant letters of denization to foreigners, making them English subjects, and the Parliament has exercised at pleasure the power of naturalization.

In France the whole subject is regulated by written law, which plainly declares who are citizens, (citoyens français,) and who are only the French, (Français,) meaning the whole body of the French people. (See Les Codes Français, titre premier.) And the same law distinctly sets forth by what means citizenship and the quality of French may bo lost and regained ; and maintains fully the right of expatriation in the subject, and the power of naturalization in the nation to which he goes.

In the United States it is too late now to deny the political rights and obligations conferred and imposed by nativity; for our laws do not pretend to create or enact them, but do assume and recognize them as things known to all men, because pre-existent and natural, and therefore things of which the laws must take cognizance. Acting out this guiding thought, our Constitution does no more than grant to Congress (rather than to any other department) the power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.” And our laws made in pursuance thereof indue the made citizen with all the rights and obligations of the natural citizen. And so strongly was Congress impressed with the great legal fact that the child takes its political status in the, nation whore it is born, that it was found necessary to pass a law to prevent the alienage of children of our known fellow-citizens who happen to be born in foreign countries. The act of February 10, 1855, (10 Statutes, 604,) provides that “persons,” (not white, persons) “persons heretofore born, and hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were, or shall be at the time of their birth, citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered, and are hereby declared to be, citizens of the United States : Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.”

“SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to bo a citizen.”

But for that act, children of our citizens who happen to be born at London, Paris, or Rome, while their parents are there on a private visit of pleasure or business, might be brought to the native home of their parents, only to find that they themselves were aliens in their father’s country, incapable of inheriting their father’s land, and with no right to demand the protection of their father’s Government.

That is the law of birth at the common law of England, clear and unqualified ; and now, both in England and America, modified only by statutes made from time to time, to meet emergencies as they arise.

Every citizen of the United States is a competent member of the nation, with rights and duties, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, which cannot be destroyed or abridged by the laws of any particular State. The laws of the State if they conflict with the laws of the nation are of no force. The Constitution is plain beyond cavil upon this point. Article 6 : ” This Constirution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties, &c., shall he the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall he bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” * And from this I assume, that every person who is a citizen of the. United States, whether Ъу birth or naturalization, holds his great franchise by the laws of the United States, and above the control of any particular State. Citizenship of the United States is an integral thing, incapable of legal existence in fractional parts. Whoever, then, has that franchise is a whole citizen and a citizen of the whole, nation, and cannot he (as the argument of my learned predecessor seems to suppose) such citizen in one State and not in another.

I fully concur in the statement that ” the description, Citizen of the United States used in the Constitution, has the same meaning that it has in the several acts of Congress passed under the authority of the, Constitution.” And I freely declare my inability to conceive of any second or subordinate, meaning of the phrase as used in all those instruments. It means in them all the simple expression of the political status of the person in connection with the nation—that he is a member of the body-politic. And that is all it means, for it does not specify his rights and duties as a citizen, nor in any way refer to such “rights, privileges, and immunities” as he may happen to have, by State laws or otherwise, over and beyond what legally and naturally belong to him in his quality of citizen of the United States. State laws may, and do—nay, must—vest in individuals great privileges, powers, and duties which do not belong to the mass of their fellow-citizens, and, in doing so, they consult discretion and convenience only. One citizen, who happens to be a judge, may, under proper circumstances, sentence another to be hanged, and a third, who happens to be governor, may grant a pardon to the condemned man, who, as a citizen, is the undoubted peer of both the judge and the governor.

The Constitution, I suppose, says what it means, and does not mean what it does not say. It says nothing about “the high characteristic privileges of a citizen of the State,” (of Virginia, or any other.) I do not know what they were; but certainly in Virginia, for the first half of the existence of the commonwealth, the right of suffrage was not one of them. For during that period no man ever voted there because he was free white adult male citizen. He voted on his freehold, in land ; and no candidate, in soliciting his election, appealed to the people or to the citizens, but to the freemen only, for they alone could vote.

Obama – American with Birth Certificate to prove it

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Wed, 23 Dec 2009 22:20:29 +0000

As reported earlier today in EUR, Tom Joyner interviewed President Barack Obama this morning on his Tom Joyner Morning Show. You can listen here or read the full transcript here

My hope is that with the health care debate winding down, we get that done. The people, everybody takes a deep breath and remembers that everybody’s an American. I’ve got my birth certificate to prove it. We are all just trying to do what’s best for the country. We’re gonna have our differences, but we don’t have to attack each other’s motives which I think has become a habit in Washington. You know you know me pretty well, Tom, and I’m always an optimist. I don’t hold grudges, and I’m just interested in getting the job done.

Very funny, Merry Christmas..

Keyes/Barnett v Obama – Hilarious

Exploring the Natural Born Citizen Clause — Wed, 23 Dec 2009 18:45:08 +0000

THIS WAS E-MAILED TO ASSISTANT US ATTORNEYS ROGER WEST AND DAVID DEJUTTE
Posted on | December 23, 2009 | No Comments

Gentlemen

I would like to schedule a short phone meet and confer conference for today at 4pm regarding filing a motion to transfer of this case to DC.
thank you,

Dr. Orly Taitz ESQ
29839 Santa Margarita Pkwy ste 100
Rancho Santa Margarita Ca 92688
ph. 949-683-5411
fax 949-766-7603
orlytaitzesq.com
drtaitz.com
taitzofficesuites.com