Hollister v Soetoro – Appeal 1221839 – BRIEF FOR APPELLEES PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA AND VICE PRESIDENT JOSEPH BIDEN

CASE BEING CONSIDERED FOR TREATMENT PURSUANT
TO RULE 34(j) OF THE COURT’S RULES
_______________________________________________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
_______________________________________________________
No. 09-5080
Consolidating No. 09-5161
____________________________________________________
GREGORY S. HOLLISTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BARRY SOETORO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, No. 08-cv-2254
____________________________________________________
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA
AND VICE PRESIDENT JOSEPH BIDEN
____________________________________________________

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(1), President Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph Biden (“President Obama and Vice President Biden”) submit
this Certificate as to Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases.
(A) Parties and Amici. Gregory S. Hollister (“Hollister”) was the plaintiff in the district court. He and his attorney, John D. Hemenway (“Hemenway”), are the appellants in this Court. President Obama and Vice President Biden were the defendants in the district court and are the appellees in this Court. There were no intervenors or amicus curiae in the district court. There are no intervenors or amicus curiae in this Court. Hollister’s former counsel, Lawrence J. Joyce and Philip J. Berg, have filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief in this appeal; that motion is pending.
(B) Rulings Under Review. Hollister appeals the March 5, 2009 memorandum and order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Robertson, J.) granting President Obama’s and Vice President Biden’s motion to dismiss. The memorandum is reported at 601 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2009) and is in the Appendix at 208-12. Hemenway appeals the March 24, 2009 memorandum order of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (Robertson, J.) reprimanding him for filing a frivolous lawsuit, which is reported at 258 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2009) and is in the Appendix
at 253-64.
(C) Related Cases. President Obama and Vice President Biden know of no other “related cases” as that term is defined in D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(1)(C).
However, Philip J. Berg, an attorney who signed Hollister’s complaint and additional pleadings, has been the plaintiff in several other suits that challenge
the qualifications of President Obama under the Natural Born Citizen Clause. See, e.g., Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009); Berg v. Obama, No. 08-cv-1933 (D.D.C. dismissed June 9, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-5362 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2009).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................1
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED..........................................1
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS .....................................................................2
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................6
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................7
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HOLLISTER'S COMPLAINT UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6) .............7
A. Standard of Review ...........................................................................7
B. Hollister Failed to State an Interpleader Claim Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................7
1. Hollister failed to state a claim because his alleged "stake" is an intangible duty not subject to
interpleader..............................................................................9
2. Hollister failed to state an interpleader claim because President Obama and Vice President Biden are not
adverse claimants .................................................................. 14
3. Hollister's amended complaint does not alter the district court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal................... 17
II. HOLLISTER LACKS STANDING .......................................................... 19
A. Standard of Review ......................................................................... 19
B. The District Court Should Have Dismissed the Complaint
for Lack of Article III Standing ....................................................... 20
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REPRIMANDING HEMENWAY FOR FILING A
FRIVOLOUS SUIT................................................................................... 22
A. Standard of Review ......................................................................... 22
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Reprimanding Hemenway ............................................................... 23
IV. NONDISPOSITIVE ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLANTS'
OPENING BRIEF ..................................................................................... 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)
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63920-0001/LEGAL17438354.2
A. The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Hollister's
Motion to File Interpleader and Deposit Funds or By
Holding Counsels' Pro Hac Vice Petitions in Abeyance................... 26
B. The District Court Did Not Rely on Inappropriate
Information...................................................................................... 28
C. Hollister and Hemenway's Claims of Bias Are Meritless................. 29
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 30
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
63920-0001/LEGAL17438354.2
Cases
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)..................................................... 7, 19
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank of Detroit
139 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y 1991)...................................................................10
Barr v. Clinton
370 F.3d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2004)......................................................................7
Bates v. Rumsfeld
271 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2002)................................................................22
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................... 7, 16, 27
Berg v. Obama
586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009) .......................................................................3, 4
Berg v. Obama
No. 08-cv-1933 (D.D.C. dismissed June 9, 2009) appeal docketed, No.
09-5362 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2009)..............................................................3, 4
Bierman v. Marcus
246 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1957) .........................................................................16
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents
403 U.S. 388 (1971) ..................................................................... 4, 17, 18, 19
Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).....................................30
Cohen v. Obama
2008 WL 5191864 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2008)....................................................5
*Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. United States
999 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993)....................................................................8, 9
Constitution Party v. Lingle
2008 WL 5125984 (Haw. Dec. 5, 2008).........................................................5
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.
496 U.S. 384 (1990) .....................................................................................22
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko
534 U.S. 61 (2001).......................................................................................19
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno
547 U.S. 332 (2006) .....................................................................................20
Dist. of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc.
750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).............................................................. 11, 19
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
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63920-0001/LEGAL17438354.2
Dunbar v. United States
502 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1974) ..........................................................................9
Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann
460 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2006)................................................................18
Figueroa-Ruiz v. Alegria
905 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1990) ........................................................................24
Fletcher v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.
133 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1942)......................................................................28
Freeman v. B & B Assocs., 790 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..............................20
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc.
528 U.S. 167 (2000) .....................................................................................21
Groper v. Taff, 717 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983)...............................................27
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Madole
48 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 1999)....................................................................8
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov
899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1990)........................................................................24
Hollander v. McCain
566 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008)..................................................................5
In re John McCain's Ineligibility to be on Presidential Primary Ballot in
Pa.
944 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2008) ..................................................................................5
Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.
733 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1984) ........................................................................16
James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman
229 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2000)......................................................................19
Lightfoot v. Bowen
No. S168690 (Cal. Dec. 5, 2008)....................................................................5
Likety v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) ...................................................30
*Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......................................................................... 20, 21, 22
Marquis v. Reed
No. 08-2-34955 SEA (Wash. Super Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) ..................................5
Martin v. Lingle
No. 08-1-2147 (Haw. Oct. 22, 2008)..............................................................5
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
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63920-0001/LEGAL17438354.2
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization
858 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................9
Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co.
534 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976) ................................................................ 10, 11
Nwachukwu v. Karl
223 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2002)..................................................................8
NYLife Distribs., Inc. v. Adherence Group, Inc.
72 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 1995) ...........................................................................12
Rafferty v. NYNEX Corp.
60 F.3d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1995)........................................................................22
Renal Physicians Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Heath & Human Servs.
489 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2007)....................................................................19
Robinson v. Bowen
567 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ..........................................................5
Roy v. Fed. Election
2008 WL 4921263 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2008) ...........................................5
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995)....................................................19
S. Pac. Communications Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).....................................................................................................29
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976).......................................................................................21
Stamper v. United States
2008 WL 4838073 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2008) ................................................5
Star Ins. Co. v. Cedar Valley Express, LLC
273 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2002)..............................................................8, 9
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.
308 U.S. 66 (1939).......................................................................................14
United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1991).........................29
United States v. High Tech. Prods., Inc.
497 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................14
United States v. Johnson
319 U.S. 302 (1943) .....................................................................................17
Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.
832 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1987)......................................................................28
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
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63920-0001/LEGAL17438354.2
Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz|
958 A.2d 709 (Conn. 2008)............................................................................4
Xerox Corp. v. Nashua Corp.
314 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) .............................................................17
Young America's Found. v. Gates
573 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2009)......................................................................20
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ...............................................................................................1
*28 U.S.C. § 1335 ..............................................................2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14
28 U.S.C. § 455. ..............................................................................................29
Regulations and Rules
D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 78.1 ...............................................................................28
D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 83.2 ...............................................................................27
Fed. R. App. P. 3 .............................................................................................26
*Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ...............................................................5, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ........................................................................ 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 ............................................................................................17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 ..........................................................................................2, 7
Fed. R. Evid. 201.............................................................................................28
Other Authorities
*Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 7 Federal
Practice & Procedure
(2d ed. 2001) .................................................................................. 8, 9, 14, 18
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
(3d ed. 1999) ........................................................................................ 8, 9, 16
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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S. Rep. No. 558
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 5-6 (1935) ...........................................................12
U.S. Const.
art. II, § 1, cl. 5............................................................................... 2, 3, 18, 19
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Broadening the Second Stage of Federal
Interpleader,
56 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1943).........................................................................14
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: I,
45 Yale L.J. 963 (1936).......................................................................... 12, 13
Case: 09-5080 Document: 1221839 Filed: 12/22/2009 Page: 10

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this Court has jurisdiction over the consolidated appeals of the March 5, 2009 order granting President Obama’s
and Vice President Biden’s motion to dismiss (App. 208-12)1 and the March 24, 2009 memorandum order of reprimand (App. 253-64). However, as described in Section II, infra, the district court lacked jurisdiction because Hollister does not have Article III standing.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether dismissal of Hollister’s complaint was proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because he failed to state a plausible interpleader claim with
adverse claimants and a tangible stake.
2. Whether the district court should have dismissed the complaint for lack of standing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
3. Whether the district court acted within its discretion by sanctioning Hollister’s counsel for filing a frivolous suit.

1 “App. __” references are to the Appendix filed with Hollister and Hemenway’s brief.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

All applicable statutes and regulations are contained in Hollister and Hemenway’s Joint Brief.2

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS

In a complaint filed on December 31, 2008, Gregory S. Hollister alleged that he is a retired Colonel from the United States Air Force and is part of the
“Individual Ready Reserve,” which “means he is subject to Presidential recall for the rest of his life.” (App. 9-10). As a result, Hollister alleged that he owes
a “duty” to obey lawful orders of the President as Commander-in-Chief. (App. 11). Hollister made the preposterous and entirely baseless allegation that
President—then Senator—Obama may not be eligible to serve as President under Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, because President
Obama may not be a “natural born” citizen. (App. 11-12).
Based on these allegations, Hollister contended that if President Obama issues an order to reinstate Hollister to active duty, Hollister will not know whether to obey or disregard the order given his alleged uncertainty regarding the President’s citizenship status. (App. 20). Hollister asserted a single
interpleader claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. (App. 23-26). Hollister named President Obama and Vice President Biden as alleged claimants to the supposed “property” at issue—i.e., the duties Hollister contends he owes the President as Commander-in-Chief. As part of his interpleader claim, Hollister requested as a remedy, among other things, a declaration of whether President Obama is constitutionally eligible to be President of the United States under the Natural Born Citizen Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. (App. 26-28).

2 Citations to Hollister and Hemenway’s Joint Brief are abbreviated “Br. at __.”

The same day Hollister filed the complaint, he also filed a “Motion to File Interpleader and Deposit Funds with the Court.” (App. 35-41). Hollister’s
local counsel, John D. Hemenway, also sponsored motions to allow counsel Philip J. Berg3 and Lawrence Joyce—both of whom had signed the complaint
(App. 28) —to appear pro hac vice. (App. 2, Dkt. Nos. 4, 5). The district court denied the “Motion to File Interpleader and Deposit Funds” as frivolous and
held the pro hac vice motions in abeyance until the court “had the opportunity, in open court, to examine their credentials, their compentence, their good faith, and the factual and legal bases of the complaint they have signed.” (App. 54).

3 Berg has filed several other lawsuits and motions alleging essentially the same claims as the one raised in this case. See, e.g., Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009); Berg v. Obama, No. 08-cv-1933 (D.D.C. dismissed June 9, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-5362 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2009) (bringing qui tam action against President Obama under the False Claims Act for allegedly receiving a Senate salary to which he was not entitled).

On January 26, 2009, President Obama and Vice President Biden moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (App. 42-52). On February 9, 2009, the date a response to the motion to dismiss was due, Hollister instead filed an amended complaint asserting two claims: a statutory interpleader claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (App. 72) and a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (App. 76). As part of these claims, Hollister requested declaratory and injunctive relief, including, again, a declaration of whether President Obama is eligible to serve as President of the United States. (App. 79). In response to Hollister’s amended complaint, the district court ruled on February 11, 2009 that “[p]laintiff’s amended complaint . . . adds nothing to the original complaint except rhetoric and legal theory and creates no obligation upon the defendants to respond to it.” (App. 107).

On March 5, 2009, the district court granted President Obama’s and Vice President Biden’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. (App. 213).4 The district court also ordered Hemenway to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for filing a frivolous suit. (App. 213).

4 Courts throughout the nation have dismissed similar suits filed by Berg and by others. See, e.g., Berg, 586 F.3d at 234; Berg, No. 08-cv-1933 (D.D.C. dismissed June 9, 2009); Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 958 A.2d 709, 713 (Conn. 2008) (dismissing case regarding Obama for lack of statutory standing and subject matter jurisdiction); Stamper v. United States, 2008 WL 4838073, at *2

After Hollister filed two responses to the order to show cause (App. 214-41, 243-51), the district court issued a memorandum order on March 24, 2009 finding that Hemenway had violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (App. 263) and reprimanded him “for his part in the preparation, filing, and prosecution of a
legally frivolous suit” (App. 264). On March 16, 2009, Hollister filed a notice of appeal of the March 5, 2009 order of dismissal (App. 242), and Hemenway appealed the reprimand order on April 17, 2009 (App. 265). (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2008) (dismissing suit regarding Obama and McCain for
lack of jurisdiction); Roy v. Fed. Election, 2008 WL 4921263, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2008) (dismissing suit regarding Obama and McCain for failure
to state a claim); Marquis v. Reed, No. 08-2-34955 SEA (Wash. Super Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) (dismissing suit regarding Obama); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F.
Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.N.H. 2008) (dismissing suit regarding McCain on standing grounds); In re John McCain’s Ineligibility to be on Presidential Primary Ballot in Pa., 944 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2008); Lightfoot v. Bowen, No. S168690 (Cal. Dec. 5, 2008) (Original Proceeding) (denying petition for writ of mandate/prohibition and stay); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing suit regarding McCain for lack of standing and lack of a state court remedy); Constitution Party v. Lingle, 2008 WL 5125984, at *1 (Haw. Dec. 5, 2008) (unpublished) (dismissing election contest challenging Obama’s Nov. 4, 2008 victory); Martin v. Lingle, No. 08-1-2147 (Haw. Oct. 22, 2008) (Original Proceeding) (rejecting original writ petition regarding Obama on several grounds); Cohen v. Obama, 2008 WL 5191864, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2008) (dismissing suit regarding Obama on standing grounds).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Hollister’s claims fail as a matter of law because he used interpleader as a pretext to try to obtain a ruling on the Natural Born Citizen Clause. The
interpleader claim is not plausible on its face because Hollister did not allege that there are adverse claimants to his duty to be called into active service, and Hollister did not establish that this intangible duty creates a legitimate interpleader stake. As a result, Hollister failed to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Further, Hollister’s outlandish theory of personal injury is speculative and does not meet the Constitution’s standing requirement for an injury in fact.
Therefore, the district court should have dismissed Hollister’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in addition to dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reprimanding Hollister’s counsel. The sanction was based on a finding that the complaint was
not founded on a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law, and it was procedurally proper because the court issued a show cause order before reprimanding Hollister’s counsel.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HOLLISTER’S COMPLAINT UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, construing the complaint liberally, and granting
plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff must provide more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

B. Hollister Failed to State an Interpleader Claim Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

There are two types of federal interpleader: (1) “statutory interpleader” under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, and (2) “rule interpleader” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.
Both statutory and rule interpleader allow “a party who fears being exposed to the vexation of defending multiple claims to a limited fund or property that is under his control a procedure to settle the controversy and settle his obligations in a single proceeding.”5 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 7 Federal Practice & Procedure § 1704, at 540 (2d ed. 2001) (“FP & P”); see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Star Ins. Co. v. Cedar Valley Express, LLC, 273 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40 (D.D.C. 2002). Interpleader is typically used in insurance cases, where the plaintiff holds property on behalf of another but does not know to which of several adverse parties the property should be transferred. See, e.g., Star Ins. Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 38; Nwachukwu v. Karl, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2002); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Madole, 48 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 1999).

An interpleader action typically progresses in two “stages.” In the first stage, the court determines whether interpleader is appropriate based on the
facts of the case. 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 22.03[1][a] (3d ed. 1999). If the stakeholder passes the first stage, the court
then adjudicates the merits of the adverse claims and distributes the stake in the second stage. Id. 5 In interpleader, the party filing suit is generally referred to as the “stakeholder,” the parties named as defendants are referred to as the “claimants,” and the fund or property that is the subject of the action is referred to as the “stake.”

Statutory and rule interpleader are functionally identical. See id. § 22.03[3]. The “central distinction” between them is jurisdictional. See Commercial Union Ins. Co., 999 F.2d at 584. Statutory interpleader provides the district courts with original jurisdiction over cases where there are two or
more claimants to a contested fund of $500 or more, and at least two of those claimants are of diverse citizenship. In contrast, rule interpleader is a
procedural device that confers no subject matter jurisdiction. See id. (citing Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d
1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)).

As the party seeking interpleader, Hollister has the burden to allege facts supporting interpleader’s required elements. Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d
506, 511 (5th Cir. 1974); Star Ins. Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d at 41; see also 7 FP & P § 1714, at 626. Because Hollister failed to meet this burden, the district court properly dismissed Hollister’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons described below, this Court should affirm.

1. Hollister failed to state a claim because his alleged “stake” is an intangible duty not subject to interpleader

In order to sustain an interpleader action, there must be a “stake” or a “res”—”money or property of the value of $500 or more, . . . a note, bond,
certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of value or amount of $500 or more, . . . or . . . any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more.” 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a). In his complaint, Hollister asserted that his duty to serve in the armed forces, if ordered to do so by the President, constituted “property” for purposes of the interpleader statute. As the district court properly found when it dismissed this matter, an intangible duty is not “property” under the interpleader statute. Courts that have considered an intangible stake have resoundingly rejected it as a basis for interpleader. For example, in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 139 F.R.D. 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y 1991), the court emphasized that interpleader requires a res like a fund or thing of value, stating:

The “right, duty and power to manage a fleet of railcars” is not, properly speaking, a stake under the interpleader statute[.] . . . The stake requirement contemplates that there exist something analogous to a distinct fund or other thing of value subject to competing claims. . . . Although this case involves one aspect of a complex dispute involving multiple parties and multiple claims, statutory interpleader is an inappropriate means of concentrating
the entire dispute because the purported stake is not analogous to a distinct fund or other thing of value.

Id. at 307 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit
explained the policy reason behind requiring specific identifiable property as a necessary foundation for interpleader:

The plain language of the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)] clearly refers to tangible property interests or interests evidenced by a “note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance” or other similar intangible document of definite, ascertainable value. An inchoate, uncertain claim for attorney’s fees or chose [sic] in action asserted against the general assets of a party rather than specific, identifiable “property” is not a proper subject for interpleader relief. Adopting appellant’s reasoning . . . would unduly broaden federal interpleader jurisdiction to include virtually any contingent or inchoate claim which might ultimately be the subject of litigation.

Murphy, 534 F.2d at 1159.

On appeal, Hollister does not argue that the district court erred in rejecting his claim that his duty is not “property” under the statute. Instead, for the first time, he argues that his alleged stake fits within the meaning of “obligation” under 28 U.S.C. § 1335. See Br. at 14; 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a). Hollister waived this argument by not raising it in the district court. See Dist. of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

But even if this Court addresses the argument on the merits, it must fail. The fact that on appeal Hollister tries to characterize his “duty” as an “obligation” under 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a), rather than as “property,” is a distinction without a difference. Regardless of how Hollister labels the stake, it is an intangible duty that is not analogous to a distinct fund or thing of value, which is necessary to invoke federal interpleader.

The language from 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) that Hollister contends applies to his alleged stake—”or being under any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more”—was added to the Interpleader Act of 1936 and remains in the present statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1335; see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: I, 45 Yale L.J. 963, 968 & n.26 (1936).

While the legislative history behind the “obligation” provision is “scant,” NYLife Distribs., Inc. v. Adherence Group, Inc., 72 F.3d 371, 382 (3d Cir. 1995), a 1935 Senate Report makes it clear that the addition of the term “obligation” was intended to add certain types of financial instruments:

Under existing interpleader law, which is limited to certain kinds of insurance obligations, the subject matter is limited to money or property or bonds or policies of insurance or certificates of membership. Under the amended bill the subject matter is extended by the addition of notes, certificates, or other instruments. Loans are also included because insurance companies are frequently confronted by two adverse claimants of the right to borrow under policies. There are also embodied “obligations,” which would include informal contracts and probably tort obligations where the stakeholder is only a technical tort-feasor. Provision is also made for a claimant of a benefit of any of the above, which would include disputes over the right to the cash surrender value of an insurance policy. See S. Rep. No. 558, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 5-6 (1935). In a 1936 article, Professor Chafee, the architect of the 1936 Act, indicates that the “obligation” provision covers three scenarios: (1) claims resulting from construction contracts where a surety does not know whether it is obligated to pay the general contractor or subcontractor; (2) unwritten obligations for the payment of money; and (3) tort obligations where the right to tangible property is in dispute. Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: I, supra, at 971-72.

Professor Chafee explains:

The words “being under any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more” take care of other obligations which are not embodied in a formal promise to pay money, like a life insurance policy, a bond or a note. This third type will take care of claims arising out of building contracts between contractors and subcontractors. It will also take care of unwritten obligations such as debts. The word “obligation” seems broad enough to include tort obligations where the stakeholder is only a technical tortfeasor and so will not be barred from relief on the ground that the controversy is due to his own wrongdoing.

Id. at 971-72. None of the scenarios described by Professor Chafee or expressed in the 1935 Senate Report are analogous to Hollister’s claim and Hollister has made no showing that Congress intended to cover the type of intangible duty he is claiming. In fact, Hollister has not cited a single case supporting his claim that his type of intangible stake meets the statutory meaning of “obligation,” or otherwise satisfies the requirements of rule or
statutory interpleader. The Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hollister’s claim.

2. Hollister failed to state an interpleader claim because President Obama and Vice President Biden are not adverse claimants

A prerequisite to surviving the first stage of an interpleader action under either rule or statutory interpleader is the presence of two or more adverse
claimants. Statutory interpleader requires that “[t]wo or more adverse claimants . . . are claiming or may claim to be entitled to . . . money or
property[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, “‘[a] prerequisite for permitting [rule] interpleader is that two or more claimants must
be ‘adverse’ to each other.’” United States v. High Tech. Prods., Inc., 497 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting 7 FP & P § 1705).

To satisfy the “adversity” requirement, there must be an actual controversy between the claimants. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); 7 FP & P, § 1705, at 550 (stating that the adversity “requirement is not met when one of the claims clearly is devoid of substance, or . . . liability is groundless”); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 985 (1943). The mere pretense of adverse claimants to a stake is legally insufficient to support an interpleader claim.

In this case, the district court dismissed Hollister’s action because Hollister did not show that President Obama and Vice President Biden are adverse claimants to the alleged stake. (See App. 263). In his complaint, Hollister failed to allege facts that President Obama and Vice President Biden are adverse claimants. Instead, he offered only speculation. (See, e.g., App. 24 (Complaint at ¶ 52) (“Plaintiff knows that each of the Defendants . . . may have competing rights between themselves to the property rights in these duties”) (emphasis added); id. at 84 (Amended Complaint at ¶ 58 (same)). Hollister has not plead with any certainty whether a claim to his “stake” will ever be made. (See App. 18, 20, 21-24 (Complaint at ¶¶ 34, 40, 44, 47)). And he conceded in his complaint that it is pure conjecture that there is even more than one claimant. (See App. 20 (Complaint at ¶39) (stating that claims “might come, possibly in contradictory manner, from more than one source of authority”)). His allegations raise only the pretense of adversity.

On appeal, Hollister again offers nothing more than speculation. There is nothing in the record or elsewhere to support his suggestion that President
Obama and Vice President Biden are vying for the right to call Hollister into active service. Hollister concedes as much in his brief. Br. at 7 (“At this point
[sic] the two Interpleader defendants he has named are not in contention.”)).

Hollister’s assertion that there are adverse claimants does not rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.6 Hollister brought this case to litigate the issue of the President’s citizenship. In so doing, he has named President Obama and Vice President Biden as unwilling litigants to an interpleader action, based only on a pretense of adversity. Courts faced with similar claims have rejected them. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 733 F.2d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Another way to state our objection to the maintenance of this case under the interpleader statue is that there is no stake[.] . . . [W]hile the City of Baltimore is indeed asserting a right to take over the team through the eminent domain power, the Capital Improvement Board is not. It is just a lessor of the stadium.”); Bierman v. Marcus, 246 F.2d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 1957) (“Actually, what has been done in this suit has been to misuse interpleader, based on mere pretense of adverse claims to a fund, to obtain jurisdiction of controversies other than entitlement to that fund.”); Xerox Corp. v. Nashua Corp., 314 F.

6 Hollister argues that if he were able to show that the President were ineligible

“in phase 1 of the interpleader, then in phase 2 of interpleader there would clearly be a conflict between [the appellees].” Br. at 23. This argument stands
the interpleader inquiry on its head. In the first stage of interpleader, the court determines whether the case meets interpleader’s threshold requirements, including the adversity requirement; in the second, it adjudicates the merits of the adverse claims. 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 22.03[1][a] (3d ed. 1999). Supp. 1187, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“The court is not prepared to cast Xerox and RCA in the role of unwilling litigants where, upon substantial grounds, they challenge the validity of the basis upon which Nashua seeks to force them into adversary positions, while Nashua presents only its bare conclusions in support of its position.”). The district court properly dismissed Hollister’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failing to satisfy interpleader’s adversity requirement.7

3. Hollister’s amended complaint does not alter the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal

The district court properly granted President Obama’s and Vice President Biden’s motion to dismiss despite the fact that Hollister filed an amended
complaint while the motion to dismiss was pending. Hollister’s amended complaint added a cause of action under Bivens. On appeal, Hollister asserts that the amended complaint was filed as a matter of course under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and therefore the district court erred in failing to allow Hollister to proceed with the claims asserted in the amended complaint. This is not so. “Where . . . [an] amended pleading suffers

7 The lack of adversity also warrants affirming the district court’s dismissal based on justiciability concerns. Federal courts may not decide a case unless there is an actual dispute between adverse litigants. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943).

from the same defects as the original and does not change the legal theories underlying the motion to dismiss, courts have the discretion to ‘consider the
motion as being addressed to the amended pleading,’ because ‘[t]o hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance.’” Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann, 460
F. Supp. 2d 99, 103 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 6 FP & P § 1476). As the district court found, the amended complaint “add[ed] nothing to the original complaint except rhetoric and legal theory and create[d] no obligation upon the defendants to respond to it.” (App. 107).

Even if the district court abused its discretion, however, any error was harmless, because the Bivens claim, like the interpleader claim, fails to state a
claim as a matter of law. Although Hollister’s Bivens claim is not a model of clarity, he appears to be asserting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 as the
constitutional clause underpinning the claim. (See App. 79). The Supreme Court, however, has severely restricted when a plaintiff can proceed under
Bivens.

In Bivens—proceeding on the theory that a right suggests a remedy—this Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages
against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability “to any new context or new category of defendants.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66, 68 (2001)). The Supreme Court has not extended Bivens to claims based on U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Nor has Hollister even asserted an individual “right” under U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 for which he can seek redress. Given the legal insufficiency of Hollister’s Bivens claim, any error with respect to the amended complaint is harmless because “a district court need not be made to reconsider an amended complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or that would otherwise fail as a matter of law.” James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

This Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hollister’s claims.8

II. HOLLISTER LACKS STANDING
A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a litigant’s standing before the federal courts de novo. See Renal Physicians Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Heath & Human Servs., 489 F.3d
1267, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 8 Hollister argues that the interpleader is justified under the de facto officer doctrine as articulated in Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995). Br. at 18. Ryder does not address interpleader and, in any event, Hollister waived this argument by not raising it in the district court. His “honest services” argument, Br. at 6, 27-28, was also raised for the first time on appeal, and is therefore also waived. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d at 1084.

B. The District Court Should Have Dismissed the Complaint for Lack of Article III Standing

The district court assumed, without analysis, that it had jurisdiction over Hollister’s claims. (App. 210). In making its ruling, the district court did not
address President Obama’s and Vice President Biden’s argument that Hollisterlacked constitutional standing to pursue his claims. (App. 47-48). Standing “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), and this Court may address it sua sponte. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).9

As the party asserting federal jurisdiction, Hollister has the burden to allege facts demonstrating all three elements necessary for Article III standing.
See id.; Young America’s Found. v. Gates, 573 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2009). First, Hollister must demonstrate that he has suffered an “injury in fact,”—i.e., an invasion of a legally-protected interest that is “concrete and particularized” 9 Hollister suggests that President Obama and Vice President Biden were required to file a cross-appeal in order to address standing on appeal. Br. at 16. This is not so. It is “settled [that an] appellee may, without taking a crossappeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record.” Freeman v. B & B Assocs., 790 F.2d 145, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986). He also
argues, without citation to authority, that due process requires that he be given an “adequate opportunity” to address the standing argument. Br. at 17.
Hollister had the opportunity to address standing in his opening brief, see Br. at 16-17, and will have the opportunity to address it again in his reply brief. and “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, he must establish “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] . . . some third party not before the court.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).

Third, he must show a substantial likelihood that the requested relief will be redressed by a favorable decision; mere speculation is not enough. Id.; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).

Hollister has not met this burden. In his complaint, Hollister did not allege facts demonstrating that he has suffered an “injury in fact.” While Hollister asserted that he “is literally caught between a rock and a hard place” (see App. 18 (Complaint at ¶ 34)), he did not allege that he has personally suffered any injury. Even if Hollister’s peculiar claims built on a hypothetical recall to active military duty are taken at face value, Hollister engaged in the rankest speculation: He does not even allege a basis for believing that his return to duty is likely, much less probable. Instead, Hollister’s allegations expressly concede that his renewed service is pure conjecture at this point. (See, e.g., App. 18 (Complaint at ¶ 34) (“If reactivated, he comes under a duty
to obey lawful orders.”); id. at 19-23 (Complaint at ¶¶ 37, 40, 44, 47); Br. at 5 (“[I]f Col. Hollister ever receives an order recalling him to active duty.”).
Given the remoteness of the possibility that Hollister’s hypothetical will come to pass, Hollister cannot even get past the first requirement for standing—
injury in fact. See, e.g., Bates v. Rumsfeld, 271 F. Supp. 2d 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Because the likelihood that Bates will be subjected to the administration of AVA is remote, as is the situation for the other similarly situated plaintiffs who are no longer on active duty, they cannot satisfy Lujan’s first prong.”).

Accordingly, this Court should dismiss this matter for lack of standing.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REPRIMANDING HEMENWAY FOR FILING A FRIVOLOUS SUIT
A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews “‘all aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination’” for abuse of discretion. Rafferty v. NYNEX Corp., 60 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Reprimanding Hemenway

As part of its March 5, 2009 memorandum decision, the district court ordered Hollister’s local counsel, John Hemenway, to show cause why he
should not be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) for filing a frivolous complaint or for filing the complaint for an improper purpose. (See App. 211- 212). After considering Hollister’s response to the order to show cause, the district court (1) concluded that “Mr. Hemenway’s suit was not a suit in
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader”; (2) concluded that the suit was “legally frivolous”; (3) found that Hemenway had “violated at least Rule
11(b)(2)”; and (4) after weighing all the relevant considerations issued a reprimand instead of a monetary sanction. (See App. 263-64). Contrary to
Hemenway’s many arguments on appeal, the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 rulings were legally and procedurally sound and this Court should affirm them.

As discussed in Section I above, Hollister’s interpleader claim does not fit within the four corners of statutory or rule interpleader: President Obama and
Vice President Biden are not adverse claimants, and Hollister did not assert a “stake” that is subject to interpleader relief. Notably, Judge Robertson
documented how Hemenway repeatedly made arguments that were not supported by authority or, worse, cited to authority that did not support the stated propositions. The claims advanced by Hemenway were not “warranted by existing law,” and he has not shown either in the district court or on appeal that there was a “nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). The district court acted within its discretion in finding that Hemenway violated Rule 11.

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in choosing to sanction Hemenway with a reprimand. Federal District Courts exercise “virtually untrammeled” discretion in fixing the sanction to be imposed under Rule11 provided the “sanctions are appropriate to the facts of the case.” Hilton Hotels
Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Figueroa-Ruiz v. Alegria, 905 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1990) (“As an alternative to monetary sanctions, district courts may admonish or reprimand attorneys who violate Rule 11 where such a course of action is appropriate.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes (1993 amendments) (stating “[t]he court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as . . . reprimand”). The district court weighed the facts of the case and the totality of circumstances, including mitigating factors like Hemenway’s past public service, and concluded that a reprimand was sufficient to deter Hemenway from filing future suits. (See App. 263-264).

Hemenway argues that the district court could not have properly determined that the case was “frivolous” without adjudicating the merits of the case. Br. at 36. This argument is procedurally confused. As the court correctly noted (App. 256-57), the only issues properly before it were whether Hollister stated a claim in interpleader, and whether Hollister had standing to bring this suit. The court’s reprimand was based on the fact that Hemenway’s use of the interpleader statute was wholly unsupported by law. Given the case’s procedural posture, the court’s refusal to assess the merits of the underlying
claim was appropriate.

Finally, while Hemenway asserts that he should have been granted a hearing before the district court imposed the reprimand, Br. at 12, the district court’s procedure in implementing the sanction was proper. As the advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 explain, a
hearing is not required before a court imposes sanctions sua sponte: “The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with the condition
that this be done through a show cause order.” The district court in this case followed the show cause procedure before imposing sanctions. This Court
should affirm the district court’s order.

IV. NONDISPOSITIVE ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF

In their opening brief, Hollister and Hemenway request review of several nondispositive issues: (1) the district court’s denial of the Motion to File
Interpleader and Deposit Funds with the Court; (2) the district court’s decision to hold in abeyance the motions for pro hac vice admission; (3) the district court’s reference to Berg’s other litigation in its March 5, 2009 order; (4) and the district court’s purported “bias.” See, e.g., Br. at 3, 4, 39.
A. The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Hollister’s Motion to File Interpleader and Deposit Funds or By Holding Counsels’ Pro Hac Vice Petitions in Abeyance The first two issues relate to the district court’s February 4, 2009 order in which the court denied the Motion to File Interpleader and Deposit Funds with the Court as frivolous and held the motions for admission of Philip Berg and Lawrence Joyce pro hac vice in abeyance “until the Court . . . had the opportunity, in open court, to examine their credentials, their competence, their good faith, and the factual and legal bases of the complaint they have signed.” (App. 54). Both of Hollister’s notices of appeal failed to identify the February 4, 2009 order as required by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Accordingly, the Court should decline to review the February 4, 2009 order.

Even if the Court reviews these rulings, they do not impact the outcome of the district court’s judgment. First, the district court’s denial of Hollister’s Motion to File Interpleader and Deposit Funds with the Court (App. 35-41) does not affect the district court’s dismissal because the court considered the
merits of Hollister’s interpleader claim in its March 5, 2009 order. Assuming Hollister moved to deposit his “stake” with the district court, the court’s denial of this motion does not change its ultimate conclusion that the interpleader claim failed as a matter of law.

Second, it was within the district court’s discretion to hold Phillip Berg’s and Lawrence Joyce’s motions for pro hac vice admission in abeyance. Under
the rules of the District Court for the District of Columbia, attorneys may enter an appearance to appear pro hac vice not as a matter of right, but only with joint local counsel and with the permission of the district court, see D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 83.2(d), and the presiding judge is given discretion to police admission to the court’s bar. See, e.g., Groper v. Taff, 717 F.2d 1415, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1983); In re Bell, 371 F. Supp. 111, 112 (D.D.C. 1974). Further, plaintiff experienced no prejudice as a result of the district court’s decision. The February 4, 2009 order did not deter Berg and Joyce from signing six district court filings (see App. 28, 83, 125, 170, 202, 205) or from appearing on earlier  filings in this Court, and Hollister did not request oral argument (see App. 109). See D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 78.1.

B. The District Court Did Not Rely on Inappropriate Information

Hollister and Hemenway take exception to the district court’s reference to other cases brought by Berg, as well as the fact that Berg publicized these suits
on his website to raise funds to finance his litigation. Br. at 4, 39-40. Contrary to their assertion, the district court acted well within its discretion by taking notice of the other cases brought by Berg. “‘[I]t is settled law that the court may take judicial notice of other cases including the same subject matter or questions of a related nature between the same parties.’” Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Fletcher v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 133 F.2d 395, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). This is particularly so where that information is pertinent to the court’s task of policing its bar.10

Hollister and Hemenway also take issue with what they term the district court’s “preoccupation” with “blogging and twittering.” Br. at 17. This claim finds no support in the record. Judge Robertson used those terms once in the introduction to his March 5 order (App. 208); they were not part of the court’s
ratio decidendi.

10 In addressing this issue in their brief, Hollister and Hemenway argue that the district court misapplied the law of res judicata. Br. at 39. This was not, however, a ground for dismissal below.

C. Hollister and Hemenway’s Claims of Bias Are Meritless

Hemenway and Hollister devise a string of arguments that allege bias on the part of the district court. See, e.g., Br. at 33 (stating that Judge Robertson
“had no respect whatsoever for the Constitution”); Br. at 34 (alleging bias because the court attempted to impose a Rule 11 sanction on Hemenway); Br. at
30 (alleging bias because the court cited to a case in which the plaintiffs were Libyan subjects). While the precise nature of their claim is unclear,11 no bias charge is supported by the record. Facts learned by a judge during the conduct of judicial proceedings do not require recusal unless the judge’s bias “is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.” Likety v. United

11 In one case, this Court construed a claim of bias on appeal as an argument that the district court judge was required to disqualify himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455. See United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1991). If, instead, Appellants are arguing that they were denied a fair trial under the Due Process Clause, their bar is even higher. Section 445 sets “a more stringent standard for disqualification than is required by the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause. . . . Thus, a determination that a judge is not disqualified for bias necessarily includes a determination that the right to a fair trial is not violated by the judge’s presiding over the case.” S. Pac. Communications Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 990 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994). Interpreting Likety, this Court has recognized that it must take special care to avoid undermining the ability of district judges to perform their responsibilities. Particularly in hard-fought litigation dealing with controversial issues, district judges must sometimes take
strong actions and use strong words. Presiding over such challenging cases would become even more difficult if district judges had to worry that appellate courts would routinely review their decisions not just for legal error, but for bias as well. For this reason, and because except in the most unusual circumstances we trust judges to put their personal feelings aside, recusal must be limited to truly extraordinary cases . . . . Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal citations removed).

Here, there is no allegation that the district court was biased because of facts learned outside of trial. And the occasional use of strong language, or the
mere fact that the district court ruled against Hollister and Hemenway, cannot support a finding of bias. Id. Hollister and Hemenway’s bias claims fail as a
matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hollister’s claims and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reprimanding Hemenway for filing a frivolous complaint.